Technology security policy: from the cold war to the new world order by Dorsett, Dolores Melina.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1993-12
Technology security policy: from the cold war to the
new world order
Dorsett, Dolores Melina.










Principal Advisor: Richard B. Doyle
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
94-08759 MAR 13 :| A
I 4 3
~~37
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704
Public reporting burden for this collection of information in estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction,
searching exiAting data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments
regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington
Headquarteris Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to
the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
December 1993 Master's Thesis
4.. TITLE AND SUBTITLE TECHNOLOGY SECURITY POLICY: 5. FUNDING NUMBERS
FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE NEW WORLD ORDER
6. AUTHOR(S) Dolores Melina Dorsett
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING
Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION
Monterey CA 93943-5000 REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not
reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. A
13. ABSTRACT
This thesis examines U.S. technology security policy in a transitional period marked by a rapidly
changing security environment and an era of economic globalization. It provides an historical analysis
of this policy since the onset of the Cold War and a financial analysis of the $40 million budget request
for technology security, counterproliferation, and export controls in the Clinton Administration's FY
1994 defense budget presentation. The historical analysis is based largely on the evolution and roles of
two multilateral control regimes -- CoCom and the MTCR. The crux of this analysis is a detailed
examination of the fate of the $40 million request as it moved through the congressional budget
process. This analysis identifies problems and policy issues surrounding resource allocation for
technology security. Based on the treatment of the budget request by the defense committees of
Congress, a number of conclusions were drawn. Although technology security is considered a high
priority item by both the executive and legislative branches of government, Congress appropriated
funding for only 20 percent of the Administration's request. Significant decreases are attributed to
inter-agency turf struggles, the slowness with which DoD policy-making positions were filled, and an
initial spending plan that was perhaps overly ambitious and prematurely presented. Ultimately, two
reviewing bodies were born out of legislative compromise; however, potentially redundant reporting
responsibilities reduce the likelihood of a decisive review of current proliferation policy.
14. SUBJECT TERMS Financial Management, Budget, Technology Security, 15. NUMBER OF
CoCom, MTCR, Counterproliferation, Nonproliferation PAGES 123
16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFI- 18. SECURITY CLASSIFI- 19. SECURITY CLASSIFI- 20. LIMITATION OF
CATION OF REPORT CATION OF THIS PAGE CATION OF ABSTRACT ABSTRACT
Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UL
NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
Technology Security Policy:
From the Cold War to the New World Order
by
Dolores Melina Dorsett
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1987
Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of








Department of Administrative Sciences
ii
ABSTRACT
This thesis examines U.S. technology security policy in a transitional period marked by
a rapidly changing security environment and an era of economic globalization. It provides
an historical analysis of this policy since the onset of the Cold War and a financial analysis
of the $40 million budget request for technology security, counterproliferation, and export
controls in the Clinton Administration's FY 1994 defense budget presentation. The
historical analysis is based largely on the evolution and roles of two mulitlateral control
regimes -- CoCom and the MTCR. The crux of this analysis is a detailed examination of the
fate of the $40 million request as it moved through the congressional budget process. This
analysis identifies problems and policy issues surrounding resource allocation for technology
security. Based on the treatment of the budget request by the defense committees of
Congress, a number of conclusions were drawn. Although technology security is
considered a high priority item by both the executive and legislative branches of
government, Congress approved funding for only 20 percent of the Administration's
request. Significant decreases are attributed to inter-agency turf struggles, the slowness
with which DoD policy-making positions were filled, and an initial spending plan that was
perhaps overly ambitious and prematurely presented. Ultimately, two reviewing bodies
were born out of legislative compromise; however, potentially redundant reporting
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis will examine U.S. technology security policy. The examination
will consist of a qualitative analysis of this policy since the onset of the Cold War
and a quantitative analysis of the $40 million budget request for
counterproliferation in the Administration's FY 1994 defense budget presentation.
This $40 million request will be used for such measures as export control,
technology security and research. Following and building upon the review of U.S.
technology security policy, this thesis will track the Administration's budget
request through the congressional budget process, identifying and assessing the
adjustments made by the committees with jurisdiction in this area. The
development of the FY 1994 appropriation for counterproliferation will reveal the
problems and policy issues associated with technology security in the post-Cold
War environment. Among these problems and issues are the limitations affecting
U.S. policy, the roles to be played by various U.S. governmental entities (e.g.,
DoD, Commerce, State) and the differences among the congressional committees
exercising jurisdiction over technology security policy.
This question is particularly relevant in light of a new administration, shifting
priorities in the federal budget, and a rapidly changing global security and
economic environment.
A. OVERVIEW
This first chapter will contain an overview of the technology security issue and
its significance for U.S. defense policy. It will also describe the scope and
research methodology used, and the goals of this thesis.
1. The Role of Technology Security
Technology security has played an important role in U.S. foreign and
defense policy since the onset of the Cold War in the late 1940s. The
unexpectedly rapid collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War has
forced the U.S. and the rest of the world into an important transitional period in
terms of technology security. We are now faced with the difficult task of
reviewing and revising technology security policies in an evolving security
environment and an era of economic globalization.
The implications of such a review are profound. Advanced technology is
no longer monopolized by military or defense-related items. Instead, high
technology has found a place in commercial enterprise as well. In the past, high
technology was frequently "spun-off' from military-related ventures to those with
commercial applications. Today, the reverse process, "spin-on," is the norm. In
the spin-on process, commercial technological developments are used for military
applications. The spin-off and spin-on processes have increased the prevalence
and significance of "dual-use" technology which has practical applications to both
military and commercial ventures. This so-called "dual-use" technology is a major
factor in the evolution of technology security policy today, and the stakes of this
evolution are high. These policies will potentially impact U.S. national security as
well as the ability of the U.S. to compete in an increasingly global economy.
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2. Mechanisms for Implementation
For many years, the U.S. was instrumental in the formulation and
execution of multiateral technology control regimes such as the Coordinating
Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) and the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR). Historically, the U.S. has used such multilateral control
regimes as mechanisms for achieving U.S. policy objectives. Today, dramatic
changes in the threat environment and in the degree of economic and technological
interdependence among nation states are placing new strains and demands on such
organizations as they struggle to find new roles. Consequently, the evolution of
these regimes is in many ways linked to the future shape and success of U.S.
technology security policy.
a. CoCom
Carved out of wartime export control measures following WWII, for
many years CoCom was the primary mechanism for achieving U.S. technology
security policy objectives internationally. Understanding CoCom's wartime roots
and evolution in the postwar era is significant for two reasons. First, CoCom
evolved at a time of peak East-West tensions; consequently, its controls were
directed toward a well-defined target, i.e., Soviet bloc nations and the People's
Republic of China (PRC). Second, the original lists of controlled items consisted
primarily of weapons and military-related items and technologies, and did not
anticipate the proliferation of dual-use technologies prevalent today. Thus, while
U.S. technology security policy will remain closely linked to CoCom, CoCom
must find a new role in the post-Cold War order.
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b. MTCR
The Missile Technology Control Regime was established in the late
1980s to fill a perceived gap in technology security policy covering weapons of
mass destruction and the ballistic missile technologies capable of delivering them.
There appears to be a clear need for this control regime in the new world order,
especially considering the prevalence of increasing regional instability. Indeed,
the MTCR is an important development within the ongoing evolution in
technology control regimes. Although relatively new, the MTCR holds a great
deal of potential as a mechanism for influencing international counterproliferation
efforts in the future. It is likely that U.S. technology security policy will
significantly influence these efforts.
3. A Call for Change
One indication of the change in technology control policy is the inclusion
of $40 million in the FY 1994 defense budget request for counterproliferation
measures such as export control, technology security and research. Treatment of
this appropriation by the defense committees of the Congress during the budget
process will likely reveal further information concerning post-Cold War American
technology security policy. The political and budgetary development of this
appropriation illustrates the continued change in this policy area during the
transition from the Cold War period. It will also reveal important differences
among the decision-making bodies involved in shaping this policy, including the
Administration (DoD, Commerce, etc.) and the Congress (chiefly the Armed
Services Committees and the Defense Appropriation Subcommittees).
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B. SCOPE
This thesis will examine the role of the Legislative and Executive branches of
the U.S. government in the evolution of U.S. technology security policy. It will
provide the background for this policy, focusing on the purposes and actions of
CoCom and the MTCR. The impact of the end of the Cold War and the
emergence of a significantly different threat and economic environment will be
discussed. This will be followed by a detailed examination of fiscal oversight of a
specific policy item reflecting the new technology security policy, that is, its
treatment within the Clinton Administration's budget proposal, and subsequent
changes during the congressional budget process. Specifically, 'the author will
track through the congressional budget process a $40 million request for
counterproliferation measures such as export control, technology security, and
research included in the Administration's FY 1994 defense budget request. This
thesis will conclude with a discussion of the direction of U.S. technology security
policy in the future based on the issues raised during the FY 1994 budget cycle.
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This thesis will utilize an historical perspective to identify U.S. interests and
policy action concerning technology security policy. Data obtained from
congressional hearings and legislation related to the budget process during 1993
will be used to examine the scope and nature of congressional changes to the
Administration's $40 million FY 1994 budget request for technology security,
export controls, and counterproliferation measures, and to identify implications for
the role of technology security policy in a rapidly changing security environment.
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D. GOALS
The primary goal of this thesis is to answer the following question: How did
Congress respond to the FY 1994 defense budget for technology security as a
consequence of the changing role of U.S. defense technology policy after the Cold
War? In addressing this question, the author will identify issues and actions
germane to congressional legislative and fiscal oversight of the Defense
Department's role in the technology security issue.
In order to best address the primary research question, however, it will be
necessary to first consider a number of subsidiary questions. Among these are:
How has the issue of U.S. defense technology security evolved since the onset of
the Cold War? What are the scope and magnitude of the defense technology
security issue facing the U.S. today? What are the technology security policy
priorities represented by the Clinton Administration's FY 1994 request for $40
million for counterproliferation? How did the congressional defense committees
address and modify the $40 million budget request? What inferences can be
drawn about the future of U.S. defense technology security policy based upon the
treatment of this issue in the FY 1994 budget and historical trends?
These questions and more will be addressed in the following chapters. Out of
these questions and answers will come observations and conclusions about
Congress and technology security policy in the new world order. This knowledge
can be beneficial to the Defense Department and the services by providing the
congressional perspective on DoD's role in the evolving technology security issue.
Additionally, such timely analysis will enable DoD to improve resource allocation
to respond to future changes in the technology security environment.
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11. U.S. TECHNOLOGY SECURITY POLICY IN THE
NEW WORLD ORDER
This thesis begins with a discussion of the major characteristics of the so-
called "new world order" that has prompted the ongoing review of U.S. technology
security policy. The dramatically changed global security environment that is
emerging impacts not only U.S. policy, but also the role of multilateral export
control regimes like CoCom and the MTCR through which this policy is
implemented on an international scale. This chapter will also identify various
governmental entities responsible for the formation and implementation of U.S.
technology security policy. The perspective gained in this chapter provides a
useful foundation that will be built upon throughout the remaining chapters of this
thesis.
A. THE NEW WORLD ORDER
1. Collapse of the Soviet bloc
The recent collapse of the Soviet Union and its bloc nations profoundly
impacts U.S. technology security policy. One of the most visible remnants of the
effects of the Cold War years on this policy is a plethora of export controls that
remains largely intact. The demise of the Communist threat calls into question the
need for many export controls and the role of multilateral export control regimes
like CoCom. Founded shortly after WWII, CoCom sought to control the spread of
military-related and advanced industrial technologies to Soviet bloc nations and
the PRC. Through the Cold War years, this mission was facilitated by a clearly
7
defined, East-West alignment of nations and the attempt by the Communist bloc to
isolate itself from the West. Today, the lines between East and West are blurred
and the problem of identifying the threat to U.S. national security has been
compounded.
This is not to say, however, that the world is without political tensions and
military aggression. While East-West tensions have diminished, regional
instability has increased. Arguably, this poses an even more difficult challenge
with regard to export control policies: tomorrow's "enemy" may be just another
third world or developing nation today. Industrialized nations must recognize that
technology transfers to developing nations, particularly those involving dual-use
technologies, may later be used against their own military forces if the importing
nation becomes embroiled in regional instabilities. The task of developing and
modifying technology security policy in such an environment is extremely
difficult.
2. Growing International Technological Parity
Another consideration in the question of technology security policy is the
increase in levels of sophistication of military and industrial technology worldwide
and the emergence of dual-use high technology. The U.S. no longer holds an
absolute advantage in advanced technology that it did in the years immediately
following WWII. As one source stated,
...the steady rise of Japan and much of Western Europe, particularly
Germany, has brought other nations to technological parity with the United
States. With highly competent overseas rivals, particularly in high-
technology industries, the shortcomings of the U.S. technological system
stand out as they did not in earlier years.1
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The industrial and technological bases of many of the war-ravaged nations
have long since been rebuilt and, in many cases, have come to equal or surpass the
capabilities of the U.S. This poses a problem in that now there are alternate
sources of supply for high technology. Consequently, it is no longer sufficient for
the U.S. to control the spread of dual-use technology through its own export
control policies. Instead, these technologies must be controlled multilaterally.
Given the difficulty in competing in the emerging global economy, such
multilateral controls will be even more difficult to achieve in the future.
3. Emergence of a Global Economy
The phenomenon of economic globalization is at once exciting and
frightening. It has opened up vast new potential markets and stands to benefit U.S.
business if existing economic policies can be adapted to the new playing field.
Economic competition in a global environment often requires a firm to look to
foreign markets to hold or increase its respective market share. Participation and
success in foreign markets necessitates the transfer of technologies, but stringent,
unilateral U.S. export control policies can hinder such transfers and force
importers to take their business to non-U.S. firms. Conversely, whenever these
transfers involve advanced dual-use technologies, the exporting nation potentially
increases the risk to its national security.
Additionally, the emergence of a global economy makes it more difficult
to impose export controls, largely due to the "transnational" nature of many
corporations. Today, for example, many "American" companies are wholly or
partially owned by foreign interests. All of these factors hamper the effectiveness
of existing export control policies which in turn impacts technology security
policy.
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B. CONTEMPORARY U.S. TECHNOLOGY SECURITY POLICY
1. National Security -vs- Global Competitiveness
At the core of existing technology security policy lies a spectrum of export
controls. Two divergent perspectives, national security interests and global
economic competitiveness are at opposite ends of this spectrum, and existing
technology security policy largely determines where a particular item or
technology will fall within this span of control. National security interests are best
achieved through strict export control policies that relegate economic objectives
beneath those of political and security concerns. But global economic
competitiveness is more likely to be achieved in an environment of fewer, more
relaxed export controls.
During much of the Cold War period, U.S. export control policies
emphasized the national security end of the spectrum.2 Yet even with these
stringent export controls, the U.S. was able to remain the world's economic
superpower due to the sheer size and strength of its domestic economy and U.S.
dominance in still-recovering foreign markets.
Today, "...America's superior military technology will not rescue U.S.
influence; but commercial weakness may very well undermine military strength." 3
Increasingly, the U.S. is being forced to place more emphasis on the global
competitiveness end of the spectrum because of a weaker domestic economy (as
measured by its burdensome federal and trade deficits and relative decline in
technological and industrial capacities), less stringent technology transfer controls
outside of the U.S., and lingering doubts about the ability of U.S. firms to compete
in the new global arena.4 This shift has considerable implications for the future of
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CoCom and other multilateral control regimes as well as U.S. technology security
policy in general.
President Bush seemed to address this issue in the most recent National
Security Strategy. In it, he stated, "A top national security priority today must be
to strengthen economic performance at home and economic leadership abroad."'
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin has endorsed that view, noting that "...America's
failure until now to shift national spending from defense to economic
development" is one of the four emerging threats to American security. 6 This new
emphasis on economic competitiveness will likely bring a shift in export control
policies and demonstrates an increase in the relative importance of economic
objectives vis-a-vis political and national security objectives. This message may
also presage a general easing of U.S. export control policies to the levels
maintained by its CoCom partners.
2. Major Policy Players
Modem U.S. technology security policy has its roots in export controls
developed during and immediately following WWII. Initially, the Department of
Commerce was given "...the lead responsibility for the administration of controls,"
and the Department of State was made responsible for "...multilateral
coordination." 7 These Departments were expected to consult with appropriate
governmental entities as necessary, but no explic 't guidelines for interaction were
established. Interdepartmental rivalries and conflicts occurred frequently in this
arrangement and have hampered the effectiveness of U.S. technology security
policy.8
In the years since WWII, the list of governmental entities involved with
the formulation and administration of this policy has grown considerably. Today,
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the Departments of Commerce and State are still major players in technology
security policy, as is the Department of Defense. The U.S. Customs Service
within the Department of Treasury and the Department of Commerce are
responsible for enforcing export controls. Other entities with lesser roles in
technology security policy include the Departments of Energy and Justice, NASA,
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the National Security Council (NSC) and the
intelligence agencies. 9 From a commercial perspective, it is frequently asserted
that the proliferation of governmental entities involved with export controls has
decreased the effectiveness of technology security policy as well as U.S.
competitiveness in the global economy.' 0
Because each of the departments involved in U.S. export control policy
represents a different perspective, conflicts of interest frequently occur. Since the
end of WWH, these conflicts were generally decided in favor of the military or
national security concerns, often at the expense of U.S. industry. "The lack of an
effective overarching mechanism has allowed a legitimate but limited view of
military security to dominate without giving sufficient weight to the health of the
economy as a crucial element of national security."II
Another trend of the technology security policy process and its
participants became evident in the late 1980s and is perhaps more significant today
in the evolving global economic environment. During this period, the export
control decision-making and review power base "...shifted toward security,
intelligence, and law enforcement agencies and away from those entities
responsible for technology development, trade, and international economic
relations."12 Within DoD, this shift materialized in the move of technology
transfer policy away from the Office of the Under Secretary for Research and
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Engineering in favor of a new office, the Defense Technology Security Agency
(DTSA).n3 At Commerce, export control issues, once under the purview of the
International Trade Administration, were placed under the control of the Export
Administration, a separate office just below the Office of the Secretary. Finally,
the State Department's Bureau of Economic Affairs turned these policy issues over
to security assistance officials. Although these moves in themselves do not
necessarily weaken export control policy, they do present a risk "...that controls
will become increasingly unrealistic and burdensome on U.S. competitiveness and
innovation.... "14
a. Department of Commerce
The Department of Commerce is responsible for the control of
commercial equipment and technology and generally represents U.S. trade and
business interests. Commerce also regulates the export of dual-use technologies.
Through the 1970s and 1980s, however, DoD's role in the policy making and
licensing processes grew relative to that of the Commerce Department. Some have
suggested that part of the inefficiency often attributed to the licensing process is
due to a lack of resources and priority given to Commerce for that function. The
result, according to one source, "...is a lack of balance in the interagency policy
formulation process and an inefficient and unnecessarily slow licensing process."' 5
b. Department of State
The State Department regulates the export of military equipment and
technology. Its decisions are generally centered around U.S. national security and
foreign policy interests. In the early 1980s, the NSC created the Senior
Interagency Group on Foreign Policy (SIG-FP), chaired by the State Department,
to coordinate "...the implementation of policy decisions on unilateral and
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multilateral control of dual use high-technology exports."16  SIG-FP was
ineffective however, and by 1982, NSC had created the Senior Interagency Group
on International Economic Policy in an effort to better address issues with
overlapping military, economic and diplomatic concerns. Eventually, SIG-IEP
evolved into the Senior Interagency Group on Transfer of Strategic Technology
(SIG-TST) and finally ended as the Senior Interagency Group on Technology
Transfer (SIG-TT). SIG-TT has high-level representation from State, Defense and
Commerce as well as numerous other governmental entities, but it is chaired by
the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology.
a Department of Defense
DoD's controls reach into both commercial and military arenas of
technology security policy. For many years, DoD "...had a statutory obligation.. .to
review license applications for selling controlled items to proscribed
destinations."17 Once conducted by the Office of the Under Secretary for Research
and Engineering within DoD, this review is now done by the Defense Technology
Security Administration (DTSA). As the breadth of its regulatory powers
increased through the 1970s and 1980s, it can be argued that DoD applied the
adage "better safe than sorry" to many licensing decisions, favoring national
security interests over economic considerations and overruling the Departments of
State and Commerce in many cases.
3. Future of Export Controls
In light of the arguments presented above, some suggest that many U.S.
"export control policies, especially those applicable to dual-use technology, have
been overtaken by events. After all, these policies have their roots in the Cold
War environment and seem best designed for use against a well-defined enemy.
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As such, they seem ill-suited for use in the new world order. Instead of trying to
update existing policies, it may be time to step back and carefully analyze the
foundation on which these policies were built and the goals of such policies in the
future.
Existing stringent, unilateral controls and enforcement measures are
unlikely to be effective in a global marketplace. The availability of alternate
supply sources, the growth of dual-use technology, and the characteristics of the
new world order diminish the effectiveness of unilateral controls. Future export
controls must be executed through multilateral regimes. Further, these regimes
must clearly identify the threat and focus a narrower breadth of controls on those
threats. Chapters III and IV will focus on two such regimes, CoCom and the
MTCR, and use them as vehicles for tracing the evolution of U.S. export control
policy since the end of WWI.
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Il. TECHNOLOGY SECURITY - THE COLD WAR AND COCOM
Historically, U.S. technology security policy has been closely linked to
multilateral technology control regimes like the Coordinating Committee for
Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom). Since the onset of the Cold War in the late
1940s, the U.S. has been instrumental in the formation and operation of these
regimes. Recently however, dramatic changes in the threat environment and in the
degree of economic and technological interdependence among nation states are
placing new strains and demands on such organizations as they struggle to find
new roles. Like CoCom, U.S. technology security policy must also evolve in order
to function effectively in the new global environment. This chapter will present an
historical overview of U.S. technology security policy during the Cold War years,
focusing on the development of CoCom as the primary mechanism for achieving
U.S. policy objectives and controlling the proliferation of militarily significant and
dual-use technology.
A. ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF COCOM
CoCom's roots rest in the post-WWII reconstruction efforts and in East-West
political, military and economic tensions in the postwar years. In many ways,
CoCom emerged from the existing system of U.S. export controls that had
developed during WWII.' This is particularly significant today given the new
world order in which the enemy is not so clearly defined. It also has tremendous
implications for the future of multilateral export control regimes like CoCom.
What follows is a brief discussion of the history of U.S. export control policy out
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of which CoCom emerged and highlights of CoCom's evolution in the postwar
decades.
1. U.S. Export Control Policy
In some regards, U.S. export control policy is projected on an international
scale through multilateral control regimes like CoCom. Because the two are tied
together in many ways, it is important to understand the origins of U.S. export
control policy. U.S. policy provides a means of systematically interfering with or
regulating trade and is generally enacted to protect national security, promote
foreign policy, or prevent domestic economic shortages of critical commodities. 2
The origins of U.S. export control policy can be traced back to the 1917 Trading
with the Enemies Act which predates the establishment of CoCom. This Act
"authorized the President to prohibit any kind of economic activity with designated
'enemy' countries or nationals of those countries 'during the time of war or during
any other period of national emergency declared by the President."' 3
2. National Defense Act of 1940
It was not until 1940, however, that the U.S. had any means of controlling
the transfer of militarily significant items or technology in times of peace. With
WWII underway in Europe, Congress passed the National Defense Act of 1940
which gave the President the authority to control the export of military equipment
and munitions. With this Act, the Executive branch was given the power to
impose export controls in times of war or peace. Congress renewed the Act
several times during WWII and the years immediately thereafter with no major
changes, but by 1949 the Cold War was in full swing and Congress decided to
closely review the National Defense Act and revise it as required.
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3. Export Control Act of 1949
The Export Control Act of 1949 was born out of this review and set its
sights squarely on the growing threat posed by the Soviet Union and other
Communist bloc nations. Following the devastation of WWII and the international
turmoil that ensued, Congress recognized that the free trade of advanced
technology and military items could subsequently be used against U.S. forces in
later conflicts if not properly controlled. This was particularly relevant given the
vast quantity of industrial and military technology and equipment being transferred
under the auspices of the Marshall Plan and other post-WWII reconstruction
programs.
The primary tenets of the Export Control Act are these:
Sec.2. The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of the United States
to use export controls to the extent necessary (a) to protect the domestic
economy from the excessive drain of scarce materials and to reduce the
inflationary impact of abnormil demand; (b) to further the foreign policy of
the United States and to aid in fulfilling its international responsibilities; and
(c) to exercise the necessary vigilance over exports from the standpoint of
their significance to the national security.4
4. 1949 CoCom Agreement
In addition to implementing the Export Control Act, two organizations
were formed in 1949 to address the growing threat posed by the Soviet bloc. First,
the regional treaty organization, NATO, helped to achieve the policy of
containment politically and militarily. Second, the formation of CoCom served as
a mechanism for economic containment of sorts. As many of the war ravaged
nations struggled to rebuild, the U.S. provided extensive aid, including advanced
industrial and military technologies, in order to counter the threat posed by the
Soviet bloc. Recognizing the potential dangers of diversion or further transfer of
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these advanced technologies to the USSR, the U.S., remaining NATO members
(except Iceland), Australia and Japan formed CoCom.
5. 1950- 1989
The years following WWII and the decade of the 1950s were
characterized by a strong resolve of the allies (largely with the leadership of the
U.S.) to contain the spread of Communism and the rise of the Soviet bloc. The
Western European allies and Japan were further convinced of the need for export
controls, especially on military equipment and high technologies, by the Berlin
blockade and the onset of the Korean War. In the U.S., business interests deferred
to the security concerns of strict, government imposed control policies with little
protest. Mastanduno points out that in the U.S.:
The process obviously left considerable discretion in the hands of executive
officials.. .The case-by-case approach also provided incentives to executive
officials to place items of questionable strategic utility under control. "Better
safe than sorry" was the ruling principle.5
Meanwhile, the CoCom partners made great strides in recovering from the
ravages of WWII and reestablished their industrial bases. By the end of the
decade, CoCom's stringent policies remained in place, but the coming decade
would bring increased pressure from recovered Western European nations and
Japan to ease technology security controls.
In his 1961 State of the Union address, President Kennedy asked for
"...more legal latitude in using economic relations as a means to build bridges of
friendship between the U.S. and Eastern Europe."6 Shortly after Kennedy created
the Export Control Review Board, the Cuban missile crisis negated any moves to
ease trade restrictions with the East. Subsequently, the U.S. expanded its control
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lists via the 1962 Export Control Act, and CoCom took similar action, expanding
to 161 different commodities by 1965.7
Interestingly, U.S. business interests as well as some of the CoCom
nations, continued to seek more liberalized export controls through the late 1960s.
In a recent report, one author adds that there was a perception that "When the
threat to Europe no longer appeared imminent in the mid-I 960s, the Europeans no
longer took an interest in directly confronting the Soviet Union through a broad-
based system of export controls."8
In 1969, the Export Control Act was up for renewal and pressure from the
U.S. business community, a weaker U.S. economy and some divisions within
targeted nations resulted in some effort by Congress to change the Act. First the
name was changed to the "Export Administration Act" of 1969. Although largely
a cosmetic change, the shift from "control" to "administration" reflected an easing
of tensions between East and West. More importantly, there was an effort to bring
the lengthy U.S. Control List more in line with CoCom's International List. This
effort was unsuccessful, however, and the U.S. retained a more stringent export
control policy than that of CoCom.
In the mid-1970s, the U.S. resisted another opportunity to liberalize export
controls. Faced with mounting pressure from U.S. business interests to ease
controls in a period of continued ditente, the Department of Defense directed the
Defense Science Board to conduct a comprehensive investigation of U.S.
technology control policies. The resulting report, the "Bucy Report" (named after
the chairman) was issued in 1976 and recommended fundamental changes in the
way the U.S. controlled technology. The primary recommendation of the Bucy
Report was that the U.S. should shift the focus of its controls from end products to
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the technological design and manufacturing expertise associated with "critical
technologies" and "keystone equipment."9  Interestingly, the report also
recommended that when dealing with the most critical technologies, "...the U.S.
should not release know-how beyond its borders, and then depend on CoCom for
absolute control."' 0 As occurred with the Export Administration Act of 1969,
however, U.S. technology controls changed little as a result of the Bucy Report.
In the absence of any real improvement in the red tape often ascribed to
the U.S. export control system, foreign firms began to seek alternate suppliers.
Additionally, commercial technological advances began approaching the
sophistication of military efforts, and the concept of dual-use technology became
more prevalent. U.S. firms were becoming unreliable due to excessive time
required to obtain export licenses. Further complicating matters was the apparent
inefficiency within the Department of Commerce as well as interagency tensions,
primarily between the Departments of Commerce, State, and Defense. When U.S.
firms tried to get initial indications of whether their export requests would be
approved, they often received conflicting or slow results.
In contrast to the U.S. system in which a license request could take
months to process, the Japanese, through their Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI), often responded within a few days." Foreign firms often found
other, less costly suppliers outside of the U.S. Many U.S. industries quickly
learned that the political and economic price of national security through export
controls was high. However, because the U.S. economy was still strong enough to
overshadow this cost, U.S. technology security policy remained largely unchanged
and continued to reflect the political and economic environment of the late 1940s.
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Not surprisingly, the 1980s featured more tension between the U.S. and its
CoCom partners. Western European partners continued to seek more liberal
export controls against the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This was partly
attributable to the proximity to and perceived trade opportunities with these
proscribed nations. Tensions peaked in 1982 over the Siberian Gas Pipeline
project. At the time, the U.S. was the world leader in drilling and oil extraction
technologies. When it was announced that this project included a pipeline from
Siberia to Western Europe, the U.S. tried to assert its authority to regulate exports
of U.S.-owned subsidiaries in foreign countries, including its allies "-* Western
Europe and Japan. These U.S. allies, and CoCom partners, protested and after
lengthy discussions, the U.S. eventually backed down. This was just another
example of the U.S. trying to conduct "economic warfare" against the USSR when
the other CoCom partners generally preferred the concept of "strategic embargo."12
Although differences in the level of controls applied by CoCom members
continued in the 1980s, the decade was marked by one significant change. In
1985, CoCom eased restrictions against the PRC and accorded the country special
status. The "China Notes," an addendum to the CoCom agreement, allowed the
PRC greater access to Western technology. However, exports exceeding a
specified technological level were still controlled through CoCom.
6. 1989 - Present
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, a period that saw the collapse of
the Soviet U;iou; and the Warsaw Pact, CoCom controls still resembled their
original form and the U.S. export control system remained burdensome. By 1991,
however, dramatic changes in the global threat environment precipitated a high
level CoCom meeting to address the future of the control regime. During this
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meeting, the U.S. agreed to fimdamental changes in CoCom, including an
agreement to discard the old CoCom Lists and draft a new, narrower Core List of
controlled items and technologies. The adoption of this Core List acknowledged
the increased availability of dual-use technology and the realities of a global
marketplace. It also marked a shift in emphasis from denial of technology to the
former Soviet Union and Eastern European nations to the prevention of the spread
of nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missile technology, especially among
developing nations.
While the 1991 high level meeting focused on control lists, another high
level meeting in June 1992 addressed the list of nations targeted by CoCom
controls. The members agreed to "...increase access to previously controlled
technology by the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union and the
countries of Eastern Europe by way of a new COCOM Cooperation Forum."' 3
The creation of this Forum marked a major shift in CoCom's mission. Previously
proscribed nations were given a means of becoming "deproscribed," and like the
PRC in 1985, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia received special status within
CoCom.14 Hungary was subsequently removed from the list of controlled
destinations. This shift also indirectly recognized the opening of new and vast
potential markets with enormous demands for Western technology. With these
changes, CoCom took a large step toward formalizing the end of Cold War export
control policies.
Today, as more emphasis is being placed on the threat posed by the
proliferation of technology and equipment associated with ballistic missiles and
weapons of mass destruction, CoCom continues its struggle to find a niche in the
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new world order. President Bush highlighted this point in the most recent
National Security Strategy:
In the post-Cold War era, one of our most threatening national security
challenges is the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the means to
deliver them.. .While the disintegration of the Soviet bloc has led to
relaxation of the forty-year-old East-West controls of the allied Coordinating
Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), dual-use
technologies with military applications are becoming increasingly available
throughout world markets.15
This transition is also being driven by renewed emphasis in the U.S., if not
worldwide, on the significance of economic strength and competitiveness. While
CoCom's mission continues to evolve, the need for multilateral control regimes
remains vital to U.S. interests.
B. COCOM'S STRUCTURE AND OPERATION
1. Membership and Objectives
Established in 1949, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export
Controls, or "CoCom," is an export control regime held together by an informal
agreement that operates on the basis of consensus. Its membership includes the
U.S. and other NATO countries (except Iceland), Japan and Australia. Even in the
absence of treaty status, CoCom has been quite influential in its 44 year history as
a vehicle for coordinating and controlling international exports of sensitive
technology to proscribed nations. It is organized around a framework of control
lists, allowances for exceptions and national enforcement mechanisms.' 6
Born out of the settling dust of WWII, a large part of CoCom's initial
appeal was drawn from the strength and security offered by a multilateral
organization. CoCom provided international coordination and cooperation
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unavailable or ineffective through earlier unilateral control efforts. Initially,
CoCom's controls were aimed at a well-defined target, i.e., the Soviet Union and
other Warsaw Treaty countries and the PRC. As the perceived threat of the Soviet
bloc has evolved and subsequently diminished, especially in the eyes of CoCom's
Western European partners, the list of proscribed nations has evolved as well.
This evolution has been marked not so much by its expansion, but rather for the
development of a process by which a nation can now be removed from the list.
During CoCom's existence, the list of proscribed nations has included the Soviet
Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Vietnam,
North Korea, Mongolia and the PRC.
2. Organizational Framework
One crucial element in the success of any organization is a clear definition
of the organization's objectives. CoCom is organized around three central
elements. First, CoCom's three control lists provide a means of coordinating
export control policies of members. Second, CoCom provides for exceptions to
these controls via a span of controls. Finally, CoCom provides a forum for dealing
with differences between members' policies and enforcing controls.
Representatives from member nations meet regularly to address such issues.
a. Control Lists
From the outset, it was clear that the majority of CoCom members
favored a more liberal set of controls than those recommended by the U.S. In
general, Western Europe and Japan sought to focus controls on military items and
technology tied directly to those items. Eventually, a consensus was reached on
three lists of items to be controlled by CoCom: the International Atomic Energy
List, International Munitions List and International Industrial List (also known as
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the "International List"). The first two lists are linked directly to nuclear and
military technologies over which there is little disagreement on the need for
control. Most differences and tensions among CoCom members arise over items
on the International List, primarily because of the wide range of most products and
technologies controlled there, including dual-use technologies. The International
List is the focus of the discussion which follows in this chapter.
The International List covers three types of goods:
1. items designed specially or used principally for development, production, or
utilization of arms, ammunition, or military systems;
2. items incorporating unique technological know-how, the acquisition of
which might give significant direct assistance to the development and
production of arms, ammunition, or military systems; and
3. items in which proscribed nations have a deficiency that hinders
development and production of arms, ammunition, or military systems, a
deficiency they are not likely to overcome within a reasonable period17
Once an item was placed on the International List, removing it was no
easy matter. Throughout CoCom's 44 year history, the list has expanded and
contracted, generally reflecting relations between East and West at any given point
in time. However, it was not until 1985 that a system of regular review of these
lists was instituted. The net effect on the International List governing dual-use
technologies was an overall increase in categories to 116 in 1990.'8 In 1991, the
International List was pared down to a "Core List" of only ten categories in an
effort to narrow the focus of CoCom controls. Today, the items on the Core List
are reviewed continuously, with one quarter of the list under review at any given
time.
27
3. Allowances for Exceptions
In order for an item or technology to be placed on the International List,
there must be unanimous approval of CoCom members. Once on the list,
however, not all items fall under the same set of restrictions. Instead, each item is
placed along a span of control based on its technological sophistication and
potential impact on the military capabilities of a proscribed nation. This span of
control has five levels. At the high end of this scale are technologies deemed to be
the most threatening or potentially damaging if spread beyond the control of
CoCom members. These items or technologies are subject to a general embargo
which requires unanimous support of CoCom members in order for an export
request to be approved. At the lower end of the scale, control is achieved through
administrative exception notes. Items controlled at this level are perceived to be
less critical and may be exported to a non-CoCom nation as long as its level of
sophistication falls below a set of defined technological capabilities. In this case,
the export may be carried out at the "national discretion" of the member and
requires neither CoCom approval nor advance notification. 19
4. Enforcement Mechanisms
While the development and implementation of controls within CoCom
seem well organized, provisions for enforcing these controls are lacking. Weekly
meetings are now held at CoCom's headquarters in Paris to make licensing
decisions, but there is no formal mechanism for enforcing CoCom's controls
internationally. There is considerable truth to the idea that much of CoCom's
strength and success comes from its ability to discourage or preempt the
proliferation of sensitive technologies. One view holds that,
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Export control groups flmction as regimes internally, where they stress
voluntary restraint based on self-interest and promotion of shared values.
They act more like alliances externally, relying on pressure and duress.20
Once CoCom's controls are violated, ensuing enforcement measures seem
inconsequential, if imposed at all. Frequently, violations result in no action by
CoCom because of the difficulty in reaching consensus on multilateral
enforcement. This occasionally leads to unilateral enforcement of controls, most
often by the U.S., which is decidedly less effective.
a. National Legislation
Enforcement mechanisms are arguably the most sensitive and
contentious issue surrounding CoCom, and generally fall into one of four types.
The first of these is national legislation. Because there is no formal CoCom treaty,
enforcement is often left to separate legislation enacted by each partner. In theory,
this arrangement might work if each CoCom member adopted legislation with
similar, if not identical, language and principles. In practice, however, the diverse
cultures and legislative processes of each partner have instead resulted in an
inconsistent range of national enforcement mechanisms.
b. Multilateral Cooperation
Multilateral cooperation efforts like the international import
certification/delivery verification (IC/DV) system may also facilitate enforcement
of CoCom controls. The IC/DV system is used by five CoCom members: Canada,
France, Japan, the United Kingdom and Germany. Under IC/DV, the importer
"...assumes the responsibility for preventing diversionary reexport to proscribed
destinations." 21 Although IC/DV is not actually an enforcement system, it does
facilitate cooperation between participating CoCom nations and by doing so may
foster national enforcement measures when violations occur.
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c. Third Country Controls
Another means of enforcement is through third country cooperation
and is frequently used by the U.S. Known for its stringent technology security
standards, the U.S. often tries to impose CoCom or CoCom-type controls on third
party nations. Because there is no formal agreement in these cases, enforcement
occurs at the discretion of the third party nation when a violation occurs.
However, many of these nations have recognized the potential benefits of
conforming to CoCom standards. Foremost among these benefits is access to
advanced Western technologies. To date, "The governments of Austria, China,
Finland, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden,
Switzerland, Taiwan, and Yugoslavia have agreed to cooperate and assist in
tracking CoCom-controlled goods and help with enforcement of CoCom
restrictions."22
dL Common Standard
Finally, enforcement of controls is facilitated through the use of a
"Common Standard." The principle of a Common Standard was first recognized
and addressed in the U.S. via the Export Administration Act of 1985. In 1988,
CoCom members followed the U.S. lead and agreed to end the requirement for a
validated license for trade between CoCom member nations. Additionally, the
U.S. passed legislation applying the principle of the Common Standard to non-
CoCom nations as well. Under this legislation, much of the administrative burden
associated with trade was waived if the goods were being exported to a country
that had an effective control system in place which met the principles of the
Common Standard. The Common Standard removed a great deal of administrative
work for parties involved, provided an incentive to those nations that conformed to
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CoCom standards, and was particularly important for the European Community
which is working towards an integrated economy.
C. U.S. LEADERSHIP IN COCOM
Although CoCom is an agreement among equals, the U.S. has maintained the
role of "unofficial leader" throughout the regime's existence. Initially, Western
European nations and Japan generally acquiesced to U.S. desires. However, as the
industrial base and technological capabilities of these nations grew, so too did the
level of tension with the U.S. A large part of this tension was centered on the
more stringent controls applied by the U.S. Since CoCom's inception, the U.S. has
reserved the right to apply unilateral controls beyond the scope of the CoCom lists
if it was deemed to be in the best interests of U.S. national security, primarily
because the majority of advanced technology originated in the U.S. immediately
following WWII and into the 1950s. This rigid, unilateral control system remains
largely intact in the U.S. today.
The three most contentious aspects of these U.S. controls hinge on the
assertion of the U.S. that it control all reexports of products and technology
originating in the U.S., exports of foreign-made items with U.S. parts based on
U.S. technology, and exports of non-U.S. items by U.S.-owned subsidiaries in
foreign countries. 23 Many CoCom members perceive these unilateral controls as
redundant and perhaps even insulting because they already adhere to the IC/DV
system described earlier or to other forms of self-enforcement. Rigid, unilateral
U.S. controls potentially breakdown the vital trust that must exist between CoCom
partners if a multilateral control regime is to succeed.
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In addition to increasing tension among CoCom members, the government-
imposed higher standards of export control applied to U.S. exporters decrease the
ability of American business to compete in an international marketplace. Specific
disadvantages when operating with or competing against other CoCom members
include: (a) excessive processing time for licensing, (b) less predictability with
regard to the outcome of the request for license, (c) unilateral control of 27
additional categories of dual use technologies above CoCom's International List,
and (d) reexport requirements. 24 Additionally, when attempting to compete against
non-CoCom nations, U.S. exporters often must deal with nations that do not have
any system of national security export controls. Foreign firms are increasingly
able to obtain required technology on the open market from non-U.S. suppliers.
As a result, many U.S. industries are at a disadvantage when trying to compete in
the international marketplace.
D. CONCERNS FOR THE FUTURE
There are lessons to be learned from the CoCom experience that may increase
the likelihood of success for contemporary and future multilateral regimes like the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Three questions must be fully
addressed by these regimes if they are to succetd. First, what is the primary
mission or rationale for existence? Second, who is the "enemy" or target of
controls? Finally, what action will be taken if a violation occurs and how will it
be enforced? These questions are not easily answered. This is a source of
weakness in CoCom today. Its mission is evolving in light of a dramatically
changed political and economic environment, and consensus among the most
highly industrialized nations of the world seems more difficult to achieve in these
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times of increased economic globalization and competitiveness, proliferation of
dual-use technology, and decreased threat perception in the post-Cold War era.
Has CoCom outlived its Cold War era mandate? The answer appears to be no,
but lingering doubts remain about its role in a dramatically changed world. What
is clear, however, is that the long-term success of these multilateral control
regimes like CoCom depends on the consensus of its members and their adherence
to a well-defined mission. Further, violations of established controls must be
enforced consistently, and the means of enforcement must be established ahead of
time and imposed multilaterally. Realistically, export controls will never be able
to deny access to advanced technology. They merely treat the symptoms of a
growing demand. The underlying cause of this demand, especially when it
involves weapons of mass destruction and the technology to deliver them, must
also be addressed if long term solutions to contemporary proliferation concerns are
to be found. Whatever the outcome of this evolution, it will impact the future
shape and success of U.S. technology security policy.
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IV. TECHNOLOGY SECURITY AND ICBMS:
THE EMERGENCE OF THE MTCR
This chapter will address the role of the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR) and its link to U.S. technology security policy. Organized in the late
1980s, the MTCR is a relatively young regime, but has already become at least as
important as CoCom as a tool for achieving U.S. technology security policy goals
on a global scale. CoCom has narrowed the focus of its controls in the 1990s to
better address proliferation concerns in the political, economic and military
realities of the emerging world order. This is illustrated by CoCom's reduced
restrictions on trade of dual-use items with the East, the establishment of regular
review of CoCom controlled technologies and products, and the development of a
significantly shorter "Core List" of dual-use, industrial technologies in 1991.1
Meanwhile, the MTCR goes to the heart of contemporary security issues
today -- the proliferation of ballistic missile technology used to deliver potentially
destabilizing weapons of mass destruction. By targeting ballistic missile
technology, the MTCR complements the efforts of other arms and technology
control regimes like the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons
Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention by denying access to means of
delivering those payloads rapidly and over long distances. While the proliferation
of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction is an equally
serious threat to global security, this chapter will focus on the MTCR and its
objectives.
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The technology associated with ballistic missiles is more widely available than
ever, thus increasing concerns of proliferation. As of 1992,
...28 countries.. .possess operational or near-operational ballistic missiles with
flight ranges greater than 30 km, 23 have the capability to produce them, 5
have been supplying missiles to others, and 18 have ongoing indigenous
capability that could lead to a supplier role in the future.2
In a sense, ballistic missiles have become the weapon of choice for an increasing
number of developing nations. This is partly true because missile-related
technology is more easily obtained and less expensive than the technology and
materials associated with nuclear weapons, and can provide a source of prestige
and leverage to nations acquiring this technology. 3 Further, some of the key
technologies required for ballistic missiles are dual-use and can be obtained under
the guise of legitimate scientific or technical programs. For example, a nation
seeking rocket booster technology for developing a ballistic missile capability may
claim that the technology will be used for space launch vehicles. This is one of
the difficult challenges facing U.S. technology security efforts and the MTCR
today.
A. SHIFTING FOCUS OF TECHNOLOGY SECURITY
As discussed in chapter III, U.S. technology security policy took the shape of
economic warfare during the Cold War and was aimed squarely at Soviet bloc
nations and the PRC. During this period, U.S. export controls were imposed
against a wide-range of items and technologies that went far beyond those linked
directly to military use. Internationally, the U.S. achieved many of its policy goals
through CoCom. However, beginning in the late 1980s, the focus of both U.S. and
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CoCom controls began a major transition in response to a rapidly changing global
security environment. The key elements of this environment are these:
I. Collapse of USSR and Warsaw Pact as military threats
2. End of the East-West rivalry
3. Rise of Japan and Germany as economic powers
4. Resurgence of ethnic and religious tensions
5. New awareness of natural resources and environment
6. Rise of regional powers
7. Increasing subnational conflict.4
With these changes, the lines between East and West, once so clear and
seemingly irreversible, blurred and so too did the need for the broad controls and
limited aim of multilateral export control regimes like CoCom. This emerging
environment introduced new threats and an increased demand for ballistic missile
technology. The MTCR was developed to fill this gap and has become an integral
part of contemporary technology security policy.
B. THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME
1. Origins
In the early 1980s, there was growing concern in Washington that U.S.
ballistic missile technology was not adequately controlled by existing regulations.
In fact, there were indications that "...U.S. missile technology was being acquired
through commercial channels."' Existing technology control regimes like CoCom
controlled some dual-use, missile-related technologies. However, CoCom's
purview extended principally to East bloc nations and the PRC and did not address
growing demand from developing nations. In an effort to address this perceived
gap, President Ronald Reagan approved National Security Decision Directive 70
in 1982 to investigate means of countering the proliferation of ballistic missiles
37
and associated technologies.6 Discussions between the Group of Seven (G-7)
nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the
United States) ensued and ultimately led to the formation of the Missile
Technology Control Regime in 1987.
2. Organization
Like CoCom, the MTCR is based on an informal agreement among
adherents and does not hold formal treaty status. It establishes "...guidelines and
procedures that missile suppliers voluntarily follow to regulate their exports of
offensive missiles and key supporting technologies or missile subcomponents."7
Central to its mission are three tenets; to restrict the transfer of missile technology,
to address the issue publicly, and to increase regional stability.8
In order to join the MTCR, a nation must sign a declaration stating that it:
...will not support the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems
other than manned aircraf, including ballistic and cruise missiles, space
launch vehicles, sounding rockets, target and reconnaissance drones, and
other non-piloted vehicles which are capable of delivering a 500-kilogram
payload a distance of 300 kilometers. 9
The export controls of these technologies are imposed on two levels; first,
by denying the transfer of the most sensitive equipment and technologies, and
second by requiring export licenses for the transfer of other sensitive technologies.
MTCR members meet biannually to review the list of controlled technologies and
guidelines for achieving control, and to provide an informal network through
which to pass relevant information and address related issues.
3. Membership
Today the MTCR includes 23 member nations as well as at least one
informal member.'0 Although the PRC agreed to follow the provisions of the
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MTCR in 1992, its recent transfer of missile technology to Pakistan suggests that
its adherence to MTCR guidelines is questionable." North Korea and the PRC,
two of the largest potential suppliers of missile-related technology, are perhaps
most problematic to this regime because of their indigenous programs and apparent
willingness to sell their wares. ' 2 Russia had also been a major supplier of missile
technology to nations offering hard currency, but its recent move to join the
MTCR and its willingness to modify or cancel deals that would have violated
MTCR provisions is encouraging news for non-proliferation advocates.
4. Strengths
Even with only an informal arrangement, the MTCR is an effective tool
for achieving the goals of non-proliferation interests in today's complex security
environment. One of its principal strengths is the narrow focus of its mission, that
is, control of ballistic missile technology. Although this narrow focus does not
guarantee unanimn•us agreement in all cases, it certainly facilitates consensus
among members. Further, the MTCR's informal arrangement might, in itself, be
considered a strength. Some nations might consider formal treaty status too
restrictive, whereas the MTCR leaves room for negotiation and flexibility in
enforcement mechanisms (although some would place this argument in the
"Weaknesses" discussion below). Like CoCom, much of this regime's strength is
drawn from delaying or discouraging the transfer of missile-related technologies
by applying diplomatic pressure or duress, or by invoking a sense of common
interests.' 3 Finally, there is a sense of shared values or common beliefs among
MTCR members that furthers the goals of non-proliferation and technology
control. However, many nations do not share these beliefs and instead see the
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possession of ballistic missiles as a legitimate source of military, political, or
economic leverage.14
5. Weaknesses
Although the MTCR enhances both U.S. and global security policies,
inherent organizational weaknesses detract from its credibility and threaten its long
term ability to succeed. Ironically, some of the MTCR's strengths addressed
earlier can also be perceived as potential weaknesses. One such weakness is the
lack of formal treaty status. In this informal arrangement, enforcement is left to
independent legislation by each member. and the result is inconsistency in the
enforcement of MTCR controls and in the application of punitive measures.' 5 It
was originally envisioned that adherents would "modify relevant legislation to
bring their laws into conformity with the new guidelines:" however; this was not
done in the U.S. until 1990; and most of the remaining members still have not
taken this action.16
Further, the informal arrangement renders success dependent not only on
the strength of national legislation implemented by MTCR adherents, but also on
their willingness to act as a group in the face of violations. Such multilateral
action is made even more difficult because the MTCR has no provisions for
verification, "...relying instead on disclosure of information from government to
government."' 7 Fundamental differences in economic and political objectives of
MTCR members may also preclude multilateral application of sanctions and
hamper long term success.Is Finally; the arguably defiant position of both the PRC
and North Korea vis-a-vis the MTCR leaves a large supply of missile-related
technology uncontrolled and further weakens the position of the MTCR.
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6. Case Studies
The following case studies are drawn from recent reports and illustrate the
role and relevance of the MTCR today. India is an example of a developing
country seeking advanced, dual-use technology from industrial powers in order to
expand indigenous "scientific" programs. Russia appears to be willing to sell
advanced technology to gain desperately needed hard currency. The instability of
the Russian economy increases the likelihood of such sales and has resulted in a
concerted effort by other industrialized nations to bring Russia into the non-
proliferation fold. Finally, the PRC has garnered considerable press coverage
recently for its apparent willingness to sell missile-related technology, despite its
promise to adhere to the MTCR. Each of these cases highlights some of the
MTCR's strengths and weakness discussed earlier, and points to the complexity of
controlling the proliferation of dual-use, missile related technology.
a. India
The failed transfer of a supercomputer between Cray Research
Corporation of the U.S. and the Indian Institute of Science in December 1992
underscores the potential damage to U.S. business interests and to technology
counterproliferation efforts caused by U.S. governmental in-fighting and
technology security controls. Cray built the $10 million supercomputer for India
in 1990, but two years of "...stubborn foot dragging by arms control specialists,
egged on by nonproliferation forces outside of government, tied up the licensing
process and in the end caused India to pull out of the deal."' 9 Although India
claimed the Cray supercomputer would be used for space vehicle development,
proliferation foes feared the it would be used to develop nuclear weapons and the
missiles to deliver them. Frustrated by U.S. indecision, India eventually applied
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the $10 million to an indigenous program and developed their own supercomputer,
the Param, that surpassed the technological capabilities of the Cray computer and
reportedly costs only $350,000.20 In the end, Cray was left with a $10 million
machine that it could not sell, and India began exporting the Param. As the
International Vice President of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce put it: "This is a
horror story that hurts U.S. commercial interests and its nonproliferation concerns
as well."21
b. Russia
Concerns over military-related technology transfers are particularly
germane in the wake of the Cold War and the break-up of the former Soviet
Union. A Washington Post headline aptly described the situation: "Nuclear Goods
Traded In Post-Soviet Bazaar: Export Controls Lacking on Russia's Rim." The
technologically advanced and vast nuclear and missile-related arsenals held by the
Independent States of the former Soviet Union may seem inviting to developing
nations seeking such technology. While briefing the Joint Economic Committee
recently, one senior U.S. intelligence official stated, "Russia and Ukraine
increasingly are authorizing export of sensitive, dual-use space-launch, chemical
and biological technologies as they attempt to save their weapons facilities and
prevent unemployment." 22 Hence, the U.S. and other industrialized nations are
aggressively trying to bring these states, especially Russia and the Ukraine, into
the non-proliferation fold, often through the use of technology security policy.
The urgency and delicacy of such efforts were recently underscored
when Libya attempted to obtain materials from Russia for its chemical weapons
and ballistic missile programs. In June of 1993, President Clinton sent President
Yeltsin a letter warning that Russian companies faced economic sanctions if such
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transfers occurred.23 At the same time, the Clinton Administration was trying to
gather congressional support for a $2.5 billion economic aid package for Russia.
Although the sale was thwarted by indirect U.S. interdiction under the auspices of
the MTCR and United Nations, this incident illustrates Russia's willingness to
overlook the proliferation of military-related technology if the payoff, much
needed hard currency, is large enough.24
In yet another example of technology security policy achieved through
multilateral control regimes, the U.S. stepped in to stop a deal that would have sent
advanced Russian rocket booster engines to India in violation of the MTCR. India
claimed that the dual-use engines would be used in a commercial satellite-
launching venture, but others feared that they would instead be used in an Indian
ballistic missile program. The U.S. had been pressuring both Russia and India
since mid-1992 to cancel the deal, and even "...announced sanctions against the
state-owned enterprises involved .... ,,2S Under continuing pressure from the U.S.,
Russia officially canceled the sale in July 1993 on the day that the earlier
announced sanctions were to go into effect. Negotiations between Russia and the
U.S. yielded some additional concessions. First, the U.S. would include Russia in
future potentially profitable joint space projects. Additionally, the U.S. conceded
approval for the sale of "...some Russian engines, but not the related technology, to
India."'26 Perhaps the most important concession was President Boris Yeltsin's
agreement to sign the MTCR. This agreement was clearly a major achievement in
the Clinton Administration's efforts to control arms proliferation.
SPRC
The PRC has recently taken center stage in the ongoing debate over
U.S. technology security policy in the 1990s. Two applications for export licenses
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in late-1992 illustrate one dimension of the ongoing power struggles between U.S.
government entities in matters concerning the control of dual-use, high-
technology. The first one involved Cray Research Corporation again, this time
seeking approval for the sale of a supercomputer to the PRC, ostensibly for the
purpose of weather research. The sale was backed by the Departments of State
and Commerce; however, the Defense Department's Defense Technology Security
Administration (DTSA) and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency opposed
the sale, fearing that the supercomputer would instead be used for ballistic missile
targeting.27
In the second incident, Allied-Signal Corporation submitted an
application to sell the PRC the right to manufacture a turbofan engine for use in a
jet trainer. As in the Cray request, DTSA and the Arms Control Disarmament
Agency opposed the sale, while Commerce and State backed it. DTSA's concerns
focused on the potential use of the engine in the Chinese cruise missile program,
but Allied-Signal claimed that the engine used 1970s technology and was "'...too
big, too heavy and too slow' for a missile.'' 28 Interestingly, the Allied-Signal
spokesman also stated that the PRC might also export the trainer to Pakistan.
More recently, the PRC has been in the headlines for the reported
transfer of ballistic missile technology to Pakistan. U.S. claims of Chinese sales of
missile technology to Pakistan first surfaced in 1991. At that time, the Bush
Administration placed sanctions on two Chinese companies and on one Pakistani
government entity for violating MTCR provisions and, more specifically, 1990
U.S. legislation concerning missile sales. The sanctions were lifted in 1992 when
the PRC agreed to abide by the MTCR provisions.29
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The same charges were leveled again in 1993 and were considered
serious enough for the Clinton Administration to impose more sanctions against
the Chinese. However, the "State Department.. .decided not to impose the strictest
measure of economic sanctions .... 30 Instead, the trade sanctions banned the
export of U.S. high-technology goods to the PRC for two years and are expected
to amount to $1 billion in lost sales, but will not impact U.S. imports from the
PRC.31 Interestingly, U.S. intelligence agencies, legislators, and the president
were aware of the charges prior to the June 1993 reconsideration of the PRC's
trade status, but the sanctions were not imposed until after the decision to extend
for one year the most favored nation (MFN) trade status for the PRC. The MFN
extension came with conditions for future extensions, including a halt in arms
proliferation, as agreed upon by the Administration and some legislators.3 2
However, the PRC had previously agreed to respect the provisions of the MTCR in
order to receive an extension of MFN status in June 1992.31
These incidents exemplify the complex and delicate nature of the
technology security policy issue today and the precarious balance that must be
maintained between political, military and economic interests. This balance is
perhaps most precarious in the cases of Russia and the PRC. The stability of
Russia remains shaky following the break-up of the Soviet Union, and the U.S.
government is tying to provide economic aid and political support to bolster the
fledgling government of Boris Yeltsin. Yet U.S. law mandates strict economic
sanctions against nations that contribute to the proliferation of missile technology,
even when, like Russia, that nation is desperate for hard currency.
The U.S. faces a different dilemma with the PRC which offers a vast
potential market for U.S. commercial ventures struggling to survive in a sluggish
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domestic economy and to compete in the global marketplace. In this case, harsh
U.S. sanctions imposed in the name of national and global security can potentially
counter the administration's efforts to revitalize U.S. industry. Still,
nonproliferation efforts remain at or near the top of the Clinton Administration's
agenda which continues to attempt to balance commercial and security concerns in
the new global economy.
C. EMERGING TECHNOLOGY SECURITY POLICY
The proliferation of dual-use, high-technology is an extremely complex
problem for which there are no easy answers. This threat also requires that some
difficult decisions be made by the nations that possess these technologies. One
thing is evident based on the discussions of CoCom and the MTCR: the U.S.
cannot stop the spread of advanced technology in the emerging global economy by
imposing and enforcing stringent export control policies unilaterally. Although
such action may keep the U.S. on the moral high-ground, it may also place U.S.
commercial interests at an economic disadvantage in the international marketplace.
Instead, the U.S. must continue to play a leadership role in multilateral regimes
like CoCom and the MTCR. Unilateral action must remain an option when vital
interests of the U.S. are at stake. However, the long-term success of these regimes
in the new world order will depend upon agreement among adherents on clearly
defined goals and multilateral enforcement of organizational guidelines.
The discussion of two important multilateral export control regimes, CoCom
and the MTCR, in chapters III and IV gives some perspective on U.S.
implementation of technology security policy during and immediately following
the Cold War. These chapters also outlined the complexities of the emerging new
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world order, most notabiy, the redefinition of national security to include and even
emphasize economic security.34 The case studies addressed earlier in this chapter
brought the discussion to the present and offer a glimpse into the Clinton
Administration's treatment of technology security issues in the emerging security
environment. This Administration will continue to develop and fine-tune a
technology security policy that will guide the U.S. through the remainder of this
century and into the next, attempting to balance counterproliferation priorities with
economic objectives.
Chapter V will more closely examine the current Administration's policy on
technology security. One indication of the shape and priorities of their policy is
the inclusion of $40 million in the FY 1994 defense budget request for
"counterproliferation measures such as export control, technology security and
research."'35 Treatment of this appropriation by the defense committees of the
Congress during the budget process will likely reveal important information
concerning post-Cold War technology security policy and the emphasis to be
placed on multilateral technology control regimes like CoCom and the MTCR.
The development of this appropriation illustrates the major changes in technology
security policy during the transition from the Cold War regime. It will also reveal
important differences among the decision-making bodies involved in this policy
area, including the Administration and relevant congressional committees.
NOTES
I Mitchel B. Wallerstein, "Controlling Dual-Use Technologies in the New World Order," Issues in
&ience and Technology, Summer 1991, pp. 74-5 and Aaron Karp, op. cit., p. 24.
2 Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat 1992, (Arlington, VA: Systems Planning
Corporation, 1992), p. 22.
3 Ibid., p. iii.
4 Ibid., p. 31.
47
3 Henshaw, op. cit., p. 23.
6 Janne E. Nolan, Trappings of Power. Ballistic Missiles in the Third World (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1991), p. 28.
7 Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat 1992, op. cit., p. iii.
9 Ibid.
9 Henshaw, op. cit., p. 24.
10 MTCR membership includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. Russia, the newest
member, agreed to join the MTCR in July 1993 (Daniel Sneider, "Russian Move To Join MTCR Stirs
Protest," Defense News, July 26-August 1, 1993, p. 6). The PRC agreed to adhere to MTCR provisions
in March 1992, but is not an official signatory (Lally Weymouth, "Chinese Take-Out," Washington
Post, August 12, 1993, p. 27).
11 Ann Devroy and R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Evidence 'Suggests' China Breaks Arms Pact," The
Washington Post, May 18, 1993, p. 9.
12 Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat 1992, op. cit., p. 22.
13 Karp, op. cit., p. 40.
14 Joseph S. Nye, "Arms Control After the Cold War," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1989/90, p. 60.
15 Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat 1992, op. cit., p. 65.
16 Henshaw, op. cit., p. 30.
17 Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat 1992, op. cit., p. 65.
18 Ibid.




22 Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Warns Russia on Missile-Fuel Sales," The New York Times, June 23. 1993,
p. 18.
23 Ibid.
24 R- Jeffrey Smith, "Libyan Efforts to Get Weapons Materials Foiled, U.S. Says," Washington Post,
June 24, 1993, p. 32.
25 Fred Hiatt, "Russian Rocket Sale Strains U.S. Ties," Washington Post, June 24, 1993, p. 29.
26 Elaine Sciolino, "Russia Is Halting Arms-Linked Sale," The New York Times, July 17, 1993, p. 4.
27 John J. Fialka, "Sale of Technology to China Becomes Center of Debate Over Weapon Exports," The
Wfall Street Journal, December 21, 1992, p. B5.
28 Ibid.
29 Lally Weymouth, op. cit., p. 27.
30 Steven A. Holmes, "U.S. Determines China Violated Pact on Missiles," The New York Times.
August 25, 1993, p. Al.
31 Ibid.
32 John J. Fialka, op. cit., p. B5.
33 Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. May Threaten China With Sanctions for Reported Arms Sales," The New York
Times, July 20, 1993, p. A3.
34 C. Fred Bergsten, "The World Economy After the Cold War," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1990, p. %.
35 Barton Gellman, "Aspin Sees No Need to Alter Defense Cuts Set for 1994," The Washington Post,
March 26, 1993, p. A17.
48
V. THE CLINTON TECHNOLOGY SECURITY PROPOSAL
Previous chapters presented an historical perspective on U.S. technology
security policy and introduced some of the major characteristics of the emerging
global security environment that have brought about a shift in the focus of this
policy. This chapter will narrow its focus to examine the treatment of the
technology security issue by the Clinton Administration during its first year in
office. The Administration's position is derived from several sources. The FY
1994 defense budget request gave some indication of the President's stance on the
topic of technology controls. President Clinton signalled a shift in technology
security policy in the recently unveiled national export strategy. The upcoming
release of Presidential Review Directive 8 is likely to provide additional clues to
the final shape of this policy. Finally, the comments and actions of executive
branch members and government representatives during the early months of this
Administration's tenure provide further insight into its policy goals.
The art of making and shaping policy in the U.S. government is a complex
process that can take many paths. In the early stages of this process, policy is
shaped and refined through a process of trial and error. During this time, the
actions and statements made by governmental agencies and administration
members set the policy on the desired course. This adds important focus to the
issues surrounding the policy, and ultimately, to the policy itself. Policy is also
shaped by the budget process and the many iterations inherent to that process.
Because of the complexity of the policy process, analysis of a specific policy
requires close scrutiny of many sources to develop a coherent result. What
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follows is a review and analysis of the treatment of technology security policy by
the Clinton Administration during its first nine months in office.
A. ADMINISTRATION PRIORITIES - SETTING THE COURSE
1. The Department of Defense
Perhaps the strongest treatment of technology security thus far in the
Clinton Administration has come out of the Department of Defense. DoD's
recently completed reorganization and "Bottom-Up Review" of its roles and
missions in the new world order have focused attention on new and emerging
threats. Featured prominently among these threats is proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, the associated technologies and delivery systems., DoD's
emphasis on the proliferation problem, including a spending initiative, highlights
the importance of counterproliferation and export controls.
a. The Defense Budget Request
Earlier this year, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and Secretary of
State Warren Christopher set the course for the debate over and evolution of
President Clinton's technology security policy. While discussing some of the
spending initiatives in the FY 1994 defense budget proposal during a March 1993
address, Secretary Aspin outlined four emerging threats to American security.2
Among these priorities was the proliferation of nuclear weapons. A related
spending initiative, if approved, would earmark $40 million within the defense
budget for "...counterproliferation measures, such as export control, technology
security, and research."3 This early identification of a separate line item for
counterproliferation efforts within the defense budget was a clear indication of the
importance of the technology security issue within the Administration.
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In October 1993, Secretary Aspin provided additional details of the
purpose and shape of the Administration's $40.5 million counterproliferation
initiative. Designed to complement and strengthen existing U.S. nonproliferation
efforts, this counterproliferation initiative would be carried out in three phases; (1)
foster an international environment that discourages proliferation, (2) determine
specific capabilities needed to counter proliferation and devise options to address
any deficiencies in this area, and (3) improve the ability to deter the use of
weapons of mass destruction, develop doctrine and tactics for dealing with them,
and incorporate the threat posed by these weapons into U.S. planning. 4 Secretary
Aspin further described this initiative as a multifaceted, multiyear effort, not all
activities of which are covered within the FY 1994 $40.5 million budget request.
Following release of the President's defense budget request, confusion
and delays caused by Defense Department restructuring and the Administration's
confirmation process may have weakened the support for the technology security
spending initiative. Initially, the Administration was slow to fill some high level
civilian positions within the Department of Defense.' According to the
Congressional Research Service (CRS), a nonpartisan research arm of Congress,
presidents since the early 1960s, had, on average, tapped more than 80 percent of
their top Pentagon officials by July 4, while President Clinton had filled only 30
percent of those same positions.6
Further complicating matters, the new defense hierarchy was in the
throes of a reorganization move by Secretary Aspin, ostensibly to strengthen its
involvement in foreign and domestic policy previously controlled by the State
Department. 7  This reorganization move consolidated more than two dozen
undersecretary positions into only four and provided new titles to some assistant
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secretary positions, thus reflecting a shift in DoD's emphasis within the Clinton
Administration.8 The majority of these changes occurred in the Defense Policy
branch and included the addition of six new Assistant Secretary positions:
Regional Security, Economic and Environmental Security, Democracy and Human
Rights, Nuclear Security and Counterproliferation, Strategy and Resources, and
Plans and Policy. 9
Although the defense request for $40 million in technology security
funds are not linked to a single office within DoD, continued delays in the
confirmation of senior DoD officials, notably Morton H. Halperin as the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Democracy and Human Rights, may further weaken the
support for defense spending initiatives during the congressional budget process.
The nomination of Mr. Halperin for this position was somewhat controversial and
has drawn the ire of some Senate conservatives.10 Senator John Warner (R-Va.), a
senior member of the Senate Armed Services Committee which has jurisdiction
over nominations for Pentagon appointments, went as far as to state that the
president and Secretary of Defense should "...carefully reconsider this
nomination.""
Regardless of the Administration's priority on technology security and
nonproliferation, political disputes between the executive and legislative branches
such as the one over the nomination of Mr. Halperin can potentially derail defense
spending initiatives and delay implementation of the Administration's policy.
Although the confirmation process is traditionally time-consuming,
the DoD reorganization effort caused additional confusion within the Department.
This confusion was particularly disruptive from a policy-making standpoint
because it occurred at a time when the Administration was developing its much
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awaited budget proposal. The defense portion of the Administration's FY 1994
budget request received additional scrutiny because it came on the heels not only
of a new administration, but it also carried the additional burden of the public's
demand for a peace dividend. So it is not surprising that the $40 million spending
initiative for counterproliferation within the FY 1994 DoD budget request would
require a strong justification and support structure to survive the congressional
budget process intact.
b. Other Policy Priorities
Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry provided additional
insight into DoD's stance on the issues of technology transfer and
counterproliferation during a May 1993 address. In it, Perry stated that "The U.S.
government should provide limited assistance to industry in making foreign sales
as long as arms proliferation concerns are met and regional tensions are not
aggravated."' 2 However, DoD's overall role in the shaping of export control policy
appears to lag that of State and Commerce.' 3 Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear Security and Counterproliferation Ashton Carter seemed to seek an
increased role for DoD during his May 1993 confirmation hearings before the
Senate Armed Services Committee. During these hearings, he told committee
members that as "Arms control and proliferation control are becoming one... [the
Pentagon] should be a more active player in formulating arms control and export
control policies aimed at preventing proliferation."' 4 These comments as well as
DoD's new organizational structure highlight the priorities of the Defense
Department under the Clinton Administration and emphasize the larger role it
seeks in technology security issues.
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2. Department of State
The Administration's technology security policy was further clarified by
Secretary of State Christopher during a June 1993 interview. Secretary
Christopher stated that the Clinton Administration would "...shift its overseas
focus to controlling the global spread of arms," and went as far as to place the
nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that deliver them
at the top of President Clinton's foreign policy agenda."5 He outlined a strategy for
addressing this issue that included:
..tougher enforcement of a host of Cold War-era statutes that control the
worldwide shipment of items that could be used in development of weapons
of mass destruction, as well as other laws that impose various sanctions on
companies and countries that violate them. The United States has greater
freedom to enforce the laws strictly now that it no longer has to weigh the
impact on competition with the former Soviet Union."6
These comments suggest that the Clinton Administration will strictly
enforce U.S. export controls and the provisions of existing multilateral export
control regimes like CoCom and tle MTCR, as well as nonproliferation treaties
and conventions like the Nonproliferation Treaty, Biological Warfare Convention
and the Chemical Warfare Convention. They also indicate the seriousness with
which the Administration takes the technology security issue.
In related policy action, Secretary Christopher addressed the future of the
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and resolved a dispute
between that agency and the State Department. The agency had been involved in
what was described as a bureaucratic tug-of-war with the State Department that
hampered the Administration's development of a coherent strategy concerning
nonproliferation. State Department officials had planned to absorb ACDA,
placing the agency within the realm of the department's undersecretary for
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international security affairs in an effort to "...integrate arms control and
nonproliferation with other foreign policy goals."' 7 Christopher's assurance that
the ACDA would remain independent is consonant with the Administration's
position on the nonproliferation issue.' 8 Christopher's action seemed to indicate
that the ACDA mission would be better accomplished independent of other foreign
policy aims.
3. Department of Commerce
In this era of competition for economic strongholds in foreign markets, the
Department of Commerce has taken steps to facilitate U.S. commercial endeavors
by seeking to ease export controls. One large step in this direction was achieved
in September 1993 when the president announced a new national export plan
aimed at increasing U.S. exports of goods and services.19 At first glance, such
efforts might seem to counter the Administration's emphasis on technology
security and counterproliferation; however, the easing of export controls on dual-
use technology is instead part of an overall government approach to balance non-
proliferation requirements and commercial needs.20 The Commerce Department,
led by Secretary of Commerce Ronald Brown, appears to be bringing Cold War-
era export controls up-to-date and refocusing these controls on U.S. technologies
that are unique, rather than on dual-use items that are available from other nations.
This new approach to counterproliferation provides incentives to developing
nations in the form of greater access to more advanced computer,
telecommunications and satellite technology in return for halting the spread of
weapons of mass destruction.
In one ongoing case, the Commerce Department is pushing for eased
controls on the export of computers and to allow foreign sales of more capable
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supercomputers. 21 This comes at a time when many in the computer industry are
claiming that U.S. controls exceed those of their foreign competitors. In the past,
such efforts have often put the Commerce Department at odds with the State
Department which is generally more conservative where dual-use advanced
computer technology is concerned, fearing that such technology will be used in the
development of nuclear or ballistic missile programs.2 However, in this case,
State and Commerce joined forces to overcome "traditional opposition from lower-
level military and intelligence officials."2 3 These new, relaxed export controls are
expected to immediately benefit U.S. computer sales to Western Europe and other
U.S. allies, and the Administration is reportedly making plans to get the new
computer limits adopted by CoCom.24
In another recent show of support for U.S. industry, Secretary Brown
made a highly unusual appearance at the 1993 Paris Air Show to promote the sale
of commercial and military aircraft by U.S. defense companies. 25 The Department
of Commerce already plays a large role in formulating and influencing technology
security policy, and there is little doubt that it will continue to advocate more
lenient controls in an effort to increase U.S. economic competitiveness.
4. The President's Agenda
By September 1993, presidential initiatives and actions had provided a
clearer view of the Administration's technology security policy goals. These
initiatives had also provided the impetus for legislative consideration of this issue
in the budget process. President Clinton provided some indication of the direction
of technology security policy in his address to the United Nations. In it, he
reiterated his priority c,_ mproliferation, and stated that "We seek...increasingl v
open trade and technology for those states that live by accepted international
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rules."26 Perhaps a stronger and more detailed indication of President Clinton's
treatment of this issue will be contained in the forthcoming Presidential Review
Directive 8 (PRD-8). Although classified, this document will reportedly outline
"U.S. policy on controlling the spread of ballistic missile technology... [and]
provide recommendations by Clinton's top national security advisers on a new
non-proliferation strategy."27
One of the two principle issues expected to be addressed in PRD-8 is U.S.
controls on the export of space launch vehicle (SLV) technology.28 The other
issue taken up by the Directive will likely involve the production of weapons-
grade chemicals used in nuclear weapons. SLV technology is a particularly
contentious issue today because of its dual-use applications. While such
technology can legitimately benefit a nation's space program, it can also easily be
applied to the development of ballistic missiles. This ambiguity is at the center of
the controversy surrounding SLV technology and presents major
counterproliferation problems like those addressed by the MTCR.29 One notable
example involved a proposed sale of Russian rocket booster engines and the
associated technology to India in violation of the MTCR. However, as discussed
in chapter IV, Russia eventually modified the deal as a consequence of U.S.
pressure and threatened sanctions.
The number of nations seeking SLV technology has increased recently due
to the potential profits from a commercial space launch program, and this in turn is
impacting U.S. technology security policy. In the past, U.S. policy, as achieved
through the MTCR, sought to ban the transfer of SLV technology. However,
initial reports on the contents of PRD-8 suggest that the U.S. may attempt to shift
its policy to allow such transfers, but only under strict conditions including the
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importing nation's adherence to the MTCR, Nonproliferation Treaty and
international nuclear, biological and chemical warfare conventions.30 Some who
view such a policy shift as problematic claim that it is too late to make such a
major policy change, citing recent U.S. led efforts to halt SLV programs in
Taiwan, Argentina, South Africa, Brazil, and India.3'
Some members of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services
Committees clearly opposed this potential policy shift. Senators Bingaman and
McCain introduced a resolution in the Senate which called for the strict
interpretation by the U.S. of the MTCR by recognizing:
...(i) the inability to distinguish space launch vehicle technology from missile
technology under the regime; and (ii) the inability to safeguard space launch
vehicle technology effectively and prevent its diversion to military
purposes. 32
Congressman McCloskey introduced this same "sense of Congress" resolution in
the House as part of an amendment he offered to the House Defense Authorization
Act. During floor debate in the House, Congressman Kyl spoke in favor of the
resolution and read from a Space News editorial that was critical of the move to
relax controls on SLV technology. It noted:
...those behind a policy shift want to show friendship to other nations as a
means of encouraging democracy and convincing them to join in
nonproliferation efforts. Selling launch technology as a friendly gesture
reflects inexcusable naivete about defense matters on the part of these public
servants.33
The resolution was ultimately adopted in both the Senate and House versions of
the National Defense Authorization Act, S. 1298 and H.R. 2401, respectively. 34
Additionally, five members of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed
Services Committees sent a letter to the White House urging that tight controls of
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SLV technology be maintained. 35 The letter, addressed to White House national
security advisor Anthony Lake, outlined the committee members' concerns:
Changing United States policy in this area would undermine United States
missile nonproliferation efforts. It would open a substantial loophole in the
MTCR regime, since participants would be free to export ballistic missile
technology under the guise of "peaceful" space launch technology. Such a
revised policy would, thus, in the long run eviscerate the MTCR -- a regime
that the United States has worked hard to foster and maintain.3 6
The Clinton technology security policy agenda continues to take shape at
this early stage of his administration. The contours will be set through the
development of related policies such as the new U.S. national export strategy,
directives like PRD-8, input from Cabinet members, and continued jockeying
between governmental entities as described above. Interaction with multilateral
control regimes like CoCom and the MTCR and legislative action on the Clinton
budget proposals will also influence the technology security policy of this
Administration.
B. EARLY TREATMENT OF EXPORT CONTROLS
1. The Administration and CoCom
CoCom was in a transitional state when the Clinton Administration began
its tenure in early 1993. Its control lists had been pared back considerably in
1991, and the list of nations targeted by CoCom's controls was still evolving to
reflect the dramatic change in East-West relations. 37 One indication of this change
occurred during the April 1993 summit meeting in Vancouver between President
Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin. In the course of this meeting,
President Clinton pledged to discuss the future of CoCom with the regime's other
members.38 The most likely forum for such a discussion was CoCom's annual
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meeting ,hat is traditionally held in June. However, the Clinton Administration
still had not filled some key U.S. administration policy posts as late as May.
Consequently, there were claims that the date for the annual CoCom meeting had
not been set due in part to the slowness of the U.S. Administration. 39
The annual meeting is an important feature of CoCom's operations
primarily because it provides a vital forum for addressing serious disputes between
CoCom members. By mid-1993, the U.S. and Germany were involved in just such
a dispute. The American Electronics Association (AEA) was lobbying the
Commerce Department to seek reductions in CoCom controls regulating
computers. The AEA claimed that many computers "...subject to CoCom controls
(were) widely available from a host of other countries including South Korea,
Taiwan, China, India and Hong Kong."4° Meanwhile, U.S. proposals to ease
restrictions on computer sales to Russia were, in effect, held "hostage" in CoCom
by a German request to ease limitations on telecommunicatiov,• technology. 41 The
U.S. opposed the German request, claiming that the technology in question could
be used in the targeting of missiles.
Although these issues have not yet been settled, the Clinton administration
plans to encourage CoCom to adopt more lenient computer limits.42 Such efforts
complement the recent relaxation of U.S. export controls on computer and
communications satellite technology.43 However, some U.S. officials fear that too
many unilateral actions by the U.S. could induce U.S. allies to "...resist proposals
to restructure CoCom."44 These issues and others will likely be addressed in an
upcoming international meeting to discuss the future organization and direction of
CoCom.45
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2. Easing U.S. Export Controls
Following a broad review of U.S. export controls that was begun in 1990,
President Clinton recently proposed significant changes to existing Cold War-era
controls.4 These changes would relax export controls on some space launch
technology, computers, fiber-optic technology, communications satellite parts and
other dual-use technologies available elsewhere in the world.47 President Clinton
alluded to these changes during his address to the U.N. in September:
We will also reform our own system of export controls in the United States
to reflect the realities of the post-cold-war world. Where we seek to enlist
the support of our former adversaries in the battle against proliferation at the
same time that we stop deadly technologies from falling into the wrong
hands, we will work with our partners to remove outdated controls that
unfairly burden legitimate commerce and unduly restrain growth and
opportunity all over the world.48
U.S. industry will be the primary beneficiary of more relaxed export
controls. The license review process for identified technologies will now require
the approval of only the Commerce Department, thus removing the "veto"
authority of the State and Defense Departments apd shortening the time for
receiving export licenses. 49 While these changes impact only U.S. controls, there
will likely be some carryover effect on international controls like those of CoCom
and the MTCR.
3. The Clinton Administration and the MTCR
The MTCR has grown in importance since its inception in 1987, as
concerns over the proliferation of ballistic missile technology have increased. The
PRC, charged recently with MTCR violations, has proven to be a persistent
problem for the Clinton Administration. According to one recent article, "...the
administration finds itself trapped in a special dilemma regarding China.'"10
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In May 1993, President Clinton granted a one year extension of the PRC's
MFN trade status despite charges that it had violated MTCR provisions.5" Critical
of President Bush for being too lenient toward Chinese misconduct in this arena,
President Clinton will likely confront the Chinese dilemma again in the future. 52
This will force him to strike a balance between two of his policy priorities -- a
pledge to halt the spread of weapons and a need to stimulate jobs through
exports.53 Congressional Democrats have urged the president to link the PRC's
trade status to its performance on the spread of weapons, 54 while at the same time
business interests remind him of the "huge opportunity" presented by the Chinese
market.55 In the recent PRC-Pakistan case, President Clinton's solution was to
impose lenient sanctions against the PRC. Even so, the president of the U.S.-
China Business Council and a former China specialist in the State Department
feared that because the sanctions were imposed unilaterally, "America's allies and
business competitors...may rush to fill the void created by the U.S. sanctions."'56
Just as President Clinton is reforming U.S. export controls on some dual-
use technologies and will likely seek similar reforms in CoCom controls, he has
also proposed steps to halt the proliferation of ballistic missile technology.
Remarks made during President Clinton's address to the U.N. in September
outlined his intentions:
Now we will seek to strengthen the principles of the Missile Technology
Control Regime by transforming it from an agreement on technology transfer
among just 23 nations to a set of rules that can command universal
adherence.57
The impact of a new national export strategy on U.S. technology security
policy in general, and on the proliferation of ballistic missile technology in
particular, remains unclear at this early juncture. However, there is little doubt
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that these Clinton Administration proposals will ultimately reshape both domestic
export controls and international controls imposed by CoCom and the MTCR to
better reflect the post-Cold War security environment.
C. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
During its first months in power, the Clinton Administration's technology
security policy has begun to take shape to address a dramatically changed global
security environment. This chapter has attempted to piece together a broad view
of this policy through review and analysis of comments from President Clinton,
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, other
Administration officials, and U.S. industry representatives. The announcement of
a new national export strategy as well as the release of Presidential Review
Directive 8 and initial estimates of its contents have also lent credence to the
Administration's emphasis in this arena. The picture that emerges reveals a set of
policy goals and a defense budget request linked to the technology security issue
that has received a great deal of attention from the Clinton Administration and will
likely draw the interest of Congress as well.
Clearly one of the Administration's early policy goals has been to retard the
proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction.
This same focus has permeated the Administration's treatment of related
counterproliferation issues like export controls, technology transfers and
multilateral technology control regimes. The priority assigned to this policy was
further emphasized by the Administration's budget request of $40 million within
the defense budget for counterproliferation efforts.58
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Although not an end in itself, this $40 million request and the Administration's
discussion of it provides one view of President Clinton's emerging technology
security policy. With the wheels of the budget process now set in motion on
Capitol Hill, legislative treatment of this request will add further perspective to
U.S. technology security policy. Chapter VI will present this analysis, focusing on
legislative action taken by the congressional committees with jurisdiction in this
arena, as well as final House and Senate decisions.
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VI. CONGRESS AND THE CLINTON TECHNOLOGY SECURITY
PROPOSAL
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Clinton Administration's technology
security policy has begun to take shape from the initiatives and actions taken in
1993. This chapter will turn its focus to the legislative branch's treatment of the
Clinton technology security proposal in order to gain additional perspective on the
future direction of U.S. technology security policy. The analysis in this chapter
will focus on congressional treatment of the Clinton Administration's $40 million
defense budget request for counterproliferation measures as it moved through the
congressional budget process. Emphasis will be placed on the treatment of and
changes made to this request by the congressional committees with jurisdiction in
this arena, namely the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and the
House and Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittees.
A. THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS
1. Defense and the Budget Process
At this juncture, it is useful to briefly review the congressional budget
process as it affects the defense budget request. Once the president has completed
his budget proposal, it is submitted to Congress, where the House and Senate
Budget Committees take the first step in the legislative budget process. The
Budget Committees report budget resolutions to their respective chamber for
consideration and passage. Once each chamber has passed its version of the
budget resolution, the congressional budget committees meet in conference to
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develop a concurrent budget resolution. The conference agreement on a budget
resolution sets total spending for defense for the upcoming year. The budget
resolution does not indicate how defense dollars are to be spent, nor does it make
any funds available. These tasks are the responsibility of the authorizing and
appropriating committees.
In the case of the defense budget, the authorizing committees are the
House and Senate Armed Services Committees. These committees identify
specific programs to be funded within the budget total for defense in the budget
resolution and authorize spending ceilings within each program. The resulting
House and Senate Defense Authorization Bills are then passed by the respective
chambers of Congress. Differences between the two bills are resolved in
conference, and the resulting agreement must then pass both the House and Senate.
The president then signs or vetoes the conference agreement on defense
authorization. Authorization legislation allows DoD to appropriate funds, but it
does not actually make any funds available. That process, the final sequence of
the defense budget cycle, occurs when appropriations bills are passed
The committees with jurisdiction over the lion's share of defense
appropriations are the House and Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittees.
These two subcommittees fall under the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees, respectively, and are responsible for developing spending floors
based on the concurrent budget resolution and the Defense Authorization Bill.
Once passed on the floor of both the House and Senate, the respective defense
appropriations bills are taken into conference. The resulting Defense
Appropriations Conference Agreement is then voted on in both chambers of
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Congress and sent to the president for signature or veto. Passage of an
appropriations bill for DoD makes funds available for the next fiscal year.
2. Legislative Centers of Power
Both the authorizing and appropriating committees are extremely powerful
and influential bodies. Their debate and actions determine not only how much
money will be made available to DoD annually, but also where and on what that
money will be spent. These committees provide both policy oversight and funding
authority for DoD programs. New initiatives such as the Clinton Administration's
nonproliferation program must be approved by these committees. New or
controversial proposals are frequently changed by one or more of the defense
committees, either in terms of objectives or funding level.
B. THE BUDGET PROCESS AND TECHNOLOGY SECURITY
In March 1993, the Department of Defense released its FY 1994 defense
budget request. Outlined in this request were three new spending initiatives
addressing the dangers of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. One of
these initiatives was a $40 million request for "counterproliferation measures, such
as export control, technology security, and research."' However, during the
budget process, the defense committees significantly modified these proposals.
To understand the congressional rationale for the modification of this
proposal, it is useful to track this item through each step in the budget process.
Initially, the priority assigned to counterproliferation measures by the Clinton
Administration, and DoD in particular, resulted in the $40 million defense budget
request being broken out under the title of "counterproliferation." 2  For
"administrative convenience" during the legislative treatment of this issue, the
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entire counterproliferation budget request ($40 million) was folded into the DTSA
account, under O&M for Defense Agencies.3 Once the congressional committees
began their work, however, the DoD counterproliferation line item received
varying treatment. The path of this budget request through the budget process was
messy and at times camouflaged. In the end, only a fraction of the
Administration's $40 million request was allocated to counterproliferation, under
DTSA. What follows is a map through this budget jungle.
1. The Authorization Process
a. The Senate Armed Services Committee
The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), chaired by Senator
Sam Nunn (D-NC), reported the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1994
(S. 1298) to the Senate in late July. After much debate over its contents and
proposed amendments, the Bill was passed on the floor on September 14, 1993.4
The SASC devoted considerable attention to technology security and
recommended that a number of actions be taken to address that issue. The SASC-
reported version of this Bill outlined these actions and associated spending ceilings
under Title XI - Prevention and Control of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction. Report language accompanying the unamended Authorization Act
states:
...since the end of the Cold War, the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction has become perhaps the key security threat to the United States
and its allies. The Congress, therefore, has good reason to require the
Executive Branch to report on the resources that the defense community is
devoting to address this threat. The data on personnel and budgets are
needed to assist Congress in determining whether resources are adequate to
perform the relevant nonproliferation missions that the Department of
Defense and the Department of Energy have been granted. It is not possible
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for Congress to properly assess the efficiency and effectiveness of these
programs without this information. 5
However, by the time the Authorization Bill was passed on the floor,
treatment of this issue was relegated to the position of a subtitle of Title II -
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, and the SASC recommendations
had been modified significantly through amendments.6
(1) Joint Committee for Review of Nonproliferation Programs.
The Senate version of the Authorization Act for FY 1994 reiterates the serious
threat presented by weapons of mass destruction and related technologies, as well
as missile systems and other delivery systems used to deliver such weapons. 7
These sentiments are in accordance with the foundations of the Clinton
Administration's technology security proposal. As a result, the SASC directed that
a new joint committee be established to address these threats. This committee was
to be composed of representatives from the Departments of Defense and Energy,
the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The SASC-reported
version directs that the committee be chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Technology [USD(A&T)].
The Senate version of the Authorization Bill, however, designated
this committee as the "Non-Proliferation Program Review Committee" and
assigned the chairmanship to the Secretary of Defense, with the further stipulation
that this responsibility may be delegated to the USD(A&T).8 In both the
committee-reported and Senate-passed versions of this bill, the duties of the
committee remain the same, that is, to identify and review existing and proposed
capabilities (including counterproliferation capabilities) and technologies for
support of U.S. nonproliferation policy, to include the support of export control
programs.
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Although the Non-Proliferation Program Review Committee
survived in the Senate-passed bill, its budget authorization was modified
somewhat. The SASC-reported version of the Defense Authorization Act did not
authorize a specific dollar amount for the committee. Instead, under the "Budget
Recommendations" subparagraph relating to this committee, the bill states that the
new committee may submit:
...any recommendations regarding existing or planned budgets as the
committee considers appropriate to encourage funding for capabilities and
technologies at the maximum level necessary to support United States
nonproliferation policy.9
It is interesting, and perhaps telling, to note the change in wording
to this subparagraph in the amended bill. The "Budget Recommendations"
passage is identical in both the committee-reported and Senate-passed versions of
the Authorization Act, with the exception of one word. The SASC-reported bill
recommended funding "...at the maximum level necessary...," while the amended
bill removed the word "maximum," leaving funding "...at the level necessary."' 0
The omission of this one word and the implications of such an action is further
reflected in the Senate's treatment of the Clinton Administration's budget request
for counterproliferation initiatives.
(2) Counterproliferation Initiatives. The SASC-reported bill and
accompanying report language clearly assigned higher priority to
counterproliferation activities and programs than did the Senate-passed version of
this bill. This is best illustrated by the deletion of authorization for
nonproliferation and counterproliferation activities and programs in the Senate-
passed version of the bill.
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Section 1105 of the SASC-reported bill, titled the International
Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Initiative, outlined a number of
activities related to technology security. These included "Activities in support of
monitoring and control of transfers of weapons of mass destruction, and delivery
systems, related technologies, and other sensitive goods and technologies; and
support of participation in and cooperative activities under multilateral
arrangements to control sensitive goods and technologies."" This section also
addressed various technology security measures included in the list of "activities."
Specifically, the report language provides for:
...assistance for the development by other countries of export control systems
that effectively -- (i) provide safeguards for imported sensitive goods and
technologies; (ii) reduce the risk of transfer and proliferation of indigenously
produced sensitive goods and technologies; and (iii) contribute to preventing
the transshipment of sensitive goods and technologies through territories of
recipient countries.I2
SASC treatment of the technology security issue was fairly
detailed. In its FY 1994 defense budget request, the Clinton Administration
sought $40 million for counterproliferation measures, such as export control,
technology security, and research. The SASC authorized appropriations of
$37,549,000, to be directed to three related areas of concern: international
nonproliferation and counterproliferation initiatives, DTSA, and studies relating to
U.S. nonproliferation policy. The committee allocated $25 million for the
nonproliferation initiatives, $9.5 million for DTSA and $3 million for studies
relating to U.S. nonproliferation policy. Under this last category, funds could be
spent on research and analysis relating to "counterproliferation deterrence
strategies and doctrines, streamlining and harmonization of export control regimes,
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arms control and nonproliferation regime enforcement, and military and threat
analysis, wargaming, and strategic analysis for export control policies."13
The National Defense Authorization Act as passed on the floor of
the Senate, however, deleted all authorizations for nonproliferation and
counterproliferation activities and programs. Recorded debate on this issue is
sparse, but one source reported that the SASC "...bowed to Senate Foreign
Relations Committee objections, and struck authorizing language that had been
included in the Committee markup."' 4 It is likely that the Foreign Relations
Committee viewed the Administration's $40 million request as a matter of foreign
policy, and thus, exerted pressure to signal that foreign policy matters belong
under the purview of the 3tate Department, not DoD. This deletion impacted
subsequent appropriations activity and also sent a signal to the Administration that
its move to improve U.S. foreign policy through DoD was, perhaps, too hasty and
overly ambitious.
TABLE 1: Senate Action on Counterproliferation Initiatives (dollars in thousands)
Budget Request Committee Authorization Change from
Markup Act Budget Request
Councrproliferation 25,000 25,000 0 -25,000
Initiatives
Research & Analysis 6,000 3,049 0 -6,000
DTSA 9,500 9,500 0 -9,500
Total 40,500 37,549 0 -40,500
Sources: SASC-reported National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1994 (S. 1298), Title XI,
Senate-passed Authorization Act, Title II, Subtitle E, and National Security Council memorandum,
Status of Counterproliferation Initiative Legislation.
While not directly addressing the deletion of authorizations for
counterproliferation and nonproliferation initiatives, the debate over amendment
836, offered by Senators Byrd and Warner and passed on the Senate floor,
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provides further insight into this action. The amendment was offered to
"...enhance the prevention and control of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction."' 5 It shifted the treatment of this matter from Title XI to a subtitle of
Title I1 of the bill. Additionally, the amendment provided for the establishment of
a joint committee for review of non-proliferation programs of the U.S. and
directed that the committee report its findings to Congress. However, it does not
provide authorizations for the international nonproliferation and
counterproliferation initiative contained in the SASC-reported bill. Instead, the
amendment seemed to substitute government coordination for further
appropriation, thus suggesting that existing funding in this area may be sufficient.
The joint committee has been tasked, albeit indirectly, to make this judgement.
Comments made on the floor by Senators Nunn, Byrd and Warner
support amendment 836 and address the Executive Branch's technology security
efforts. Senator Nunn, the SASC Chairman, backed this amendment, stating "This
underscores the Senate's continued commitment in cooperating with President
Clinton in carrying out effective policy to control proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction."'16 Senator Warner provided background information, commenting
that:
Reviews of the nonproliferation and counterproliferation programs of these
three organizations [DoD, DoE and CIA] conducted by the staff of the
Armed Services, Intelligence, and Appropriations Committees indicate that
all three of them have increased funding and activities to stem or counter the
tide of the proliferation of such weapon systems. Unfortunately,... the
programs developed by these agencies are not well coordinated. 17
Hence, the proposed joint committee was designed to "...jointly
review current and proposed programs, prioritize them, and insure that the most
promising capabilities are adequately funded.""' Senator Byrd ended the debate as
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follows, perhaps alluding to the reason for deleting $31 million in authorizations
for the Administration's counterproliferation and nonproliferation initiative:
The current informal mechanisms established by the defense and intelligence
community are not, I believe, adequate as a permanent solution to the
difficult task of consolidating and coordinating the counterproliferation
research and development program throughout the Government . . . the
committee, composed as it is of senior-level members, can actively influence
all relevant agency budget decisions in order to maximize the effective use of
resources ... This amendment is a needed step in focusing the resources and
efforts of the Executive Branch on the requirements, programs and planning
needed to address it on an urgent basis.' 9
b. The House Armed Services Committee
The House of Representatives passed its National Defense
Authorization Act for FY 1994 (H.R. 2401) on September 29, 1993.20 The
treatment of the Administration's counterproliferation and nonproliferation
initiative by the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and on the floor of the
House was in sharp contrast to the actions taken in the Senate. Ultimately, the
House Defense Authorization Act closely resembled the Administration's budget
request on these issues.
When reported to the House, the HASC markup contained no
authorizations of appropriations for counterproliferation initiatives. During House
debate, however, the committee Chairman, Ronald Dellums (D-CA), offered an
amendment that was subsequently passed and incorporated into the Bill. This
amendment added three sections to Title X -- General Provisions, Subtitle C -
Other Matters, that address the issue of counterproliferation. In addition to
authorizing appropriations for almost the full amount requested by the
Administration, these three sections, (415) International counterproliferation
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activities, (416) Counterproliferation policy, and (417) Semiannual report, outline
limitations and requirements for spending these funds.
(1) International Counterproliferation Activities. Section 415 of
the House-passed DoD Authorization bill approves $25 million to be used by the
Secretary of Defense, under the guidance of the President, for the support of
specified activities relating to the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and their delivery systems.2' Included among the activities for which assistance
may be provided are:
(1) Support of nonproliferation monitoring programs, nonproliferation
inspection programs, and nonproliferation compliance programs.
(2) Monitoring and control of transfers of weapons of mass destruction,
related technologies, and other sensitive goods and technologies.
(4) Efforts to improve international capabilities and cooperation in
deterring and responding to terrorism, theft, and proliferation involving
weapons of mass destruction. 22
Prior to obligating any part of these funds, however, the House
Bill directs the Secretary of Defense to notify the appropriate congressional
committees 15 days in advance.
(2) Counterproliferation Policy. Section 416 of the House DoD
Authorization Act addresses U.S. counterproliferation policy. This section
corresponds to the Administration's )udget request for research and analysis linked
to the counterproliferation issue. The House authorized $6 million, the full
amount of the Administration's request in this area, to "...explore defense policy
issues linked to efforts to prevent and counter the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their delivery systems."23  The House Bill also directs the
77
Secretary of Defense to designate the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to
coordinate these research programs.
TABLE 2: House Action on Counterproliferation Initiatives (dollars in thousands)
Budget Request Committee Authorization Change from
Markup Act Budget Request
Counterproliferation 25,000 0 25,000 0
Initiatives
Research & Analysis 6,000 0 6,0001 0
DTSA 9,500 0 8,698 -802
Total 40,50 0 39,6981 -802
Sources: HASC-reported National Defense Authorization Act for FY 194 (HR. 2401),
amendment offered by Congressman Dellums, Congressional Record, and National Security
Council memorandum, Status of Counterproliferation Initiative Legislation.
The House DoD Authorization bill essentially rubber-stamps the
Administration's budget request for counterproliferation initiatives. Although
sections 415, 416 and 417 of this bill stipulate numerous guidelines for obligating
the funds authorized, they are general enough to give considerable leeway to the
Administration. The wording of these sections seems designed, however, to
preclude the indiscriminate spending of these funds by the Administration. For
example, the prior notification clause attached to the $25 million international
counterproliferation funds allows Congress to retain its coveted power of the purse
and conduct fiscal oversight of the Administration's counterproliferation
initiatives. Of course, this discussion presumes that the funds authorized for
appropriation by the House and Senate are included in the conference agreement
and subsequently appropriated by both chambers of Congress.
c. Conference Report on National Defense Authorization
The final step in the authorization portion of the budget process is the
conference agreement which works out the differences between the Senate and
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House-passed versions of the National Defense Authorization Act. Once this
process is complete, both chambers of Congress must then pass this final version
of the bill. The FY 1994 conference agreement was passed on November 8, 1993,
and included a separate title addressing arm control matters.24 Not surprisingly,
the conference agreement's treatment of technology security policy was very much
a compromise between the Senate and House bills.
Title XVI, Subtitle A, Programs in Support of the Prevention and
Control of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, contained five sections
germane to the Administration's $40 million budget request. Section 1601 called
for a study of global proliferation of strategic and advanced conventional military
weapons and related equipment and technology. Section 1602 authorized funds
for international nonproliferation initiatives which were introduced in the FY 1993
Authorization Act. Section 1603 authorized the full amount requested by the
Administration for analysis and studies linked to counterproliferation policy.
Finally, sections 1605 and 1606 directed the establishment of a Joint Non-
Proliferation Program Review Committee as originally noted in the SASC version
of this bill.
(1) Advisory Board on Arms Proliferation Policy. The conference
agreement directed the establishment of an Advisory Board on Arms Proliferation
Policy to study global proliferation of strategic and advanced conventional military
weapons and related equipment and technology. The five board members will be
appointed by the President and will be supported by a federally funded research
and development center with expertise in such matters. Specifically, section 1601
states:
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The President shall conduct a study of (1) the factors that contribute to the
proliferation of strategic and advanced conventional military weapons and
related equipment and technologies, and (2) the policy options that are
available to the United States to inhibit such proliferation.25
In doing so, the President is encouraged to seek and consider the
advice of the board. Additionally, the Advisory Board is tasked to complete its
own study and present it to the President no later than May 15, 1994. The
President will subsequently present these two studies to Congress by June 1, 1994,
along with his findings and conclusions regarding matters considered in the board's
study.26 The Advisory Board will terminate 30 days after the President presents
his findings to Congress.
This section of the conference agreement appears to be a
compromise of Title XV which was included in the House version of the
Authorization Act. Title XV called for the establishment of a "National
Commission on Arms Control," and was added to the HASC-reported bill in an
amendment offered by Congressman Kasich of Ohio as part of Congressman
Dellum's en bloc amendment. 27 The Advisory Board on Arms Proliferation Policy
called for in the conference agreement is almost identical to the House version's
National Commission on Arms Control except for two key areas -- membership
and funding.
The duties and report required of the Advisory Board are almost
identical to those of the Commission called for in the House version of this bill.
With regard to membership, however, the Advisory Board would include five
members appointed by the President from "among persons in private life who are
noted for their stature and expertise," while the Commission would have been
composed of 12 members appointed by the President and majority and minority
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leaders of both the House and Senate. Further, the conference agreement makes
no provision for funds for the Advisory Board. The House's Commission was to
be authorized appropriations "...as may be necessary to carry out this title."28
(2) Extension of Existing Authorities. Title XVI of the conference
agreement also included a section authorizing "extension of existing authorities.*
This section extends additional authorizations in the amount of $25 million for
international nonproliferation initiatives that were included in section 1505 of the
FY 1993 Authorization Act. Specifically, this extension of authorities authorizes
these funds for activities carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), the On-Site Inspection Agency in support of the U.N. Special
Commission on Iraq, collaborative international nuclear security and safety
projects, and efforts to improve international cooperative monitoring of nuclear
proliferation. 29
While the provision of these funds is not unusual, the amount
authorized bears some consideration. Interestingly, the Administration's FY 1994
defense budget request included $25 million for counterproliferation and
nonproliferation initiatives. The House-passed version of the Authorization Act
granted this request while the Senate version denied it based on its objections to
DTSA control of the funds. The $25 million authorized for international
nonproliferation initiatives in the conference agreement may represent another
compromise between the two chambers. If so, the dollar amount authorized would
satisfy the Administration's request in this area, while allocating the funds in such
a way that would satisfy congressional demands for accountability of these funds.
(3) Counterproliferation Studies and Analysis. Section 1603 of the
conference agreement authorizes $6 million for "studies and analysis
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programs.. intended to explore defense policy issues that might be involved in
efforts to prevent and counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
their delivery systems."30 This is the full amount requested by the Administration
and authorized in the House-passed version of the Authorization Act. The
language describing this authorization in these two versions of the bill is almost
identical. In both, the USD(P) is designated as the coordinator of the funds which
"...shall be derived from amounts made available to [DoD] for fiscal year 1994 or
from balances in working capital accounts of the [DoD]."3' In any case, DoD will
not receive any part of the funds until 15 days after the appropriate congressional
committees are notified of the spending plan, including:
(1) a description of all of the activities within [DoD] that are being carried
out or are to be carried out for the purposes stated in this section;
(2) the plan for coordinating and integrating those activities within [DoD];
(3) the plan for coordinating and integrating those activities with those of
other Federal agencies; and
(4) the sources of funds to be used for such purposes.32
Interestingly, this entire provision is left to the discretion of the
Secretary of Defense. The conference agreement states that the Secretary "...may
conduct studies and analysis programs in support of counterproliferation policy of
the United States."33 By doing so, however, three additional reports are mandated.
The first report, described above, is essentially a spending plan required for
congressional oversight of these funds. The other two are biannual reports due
April 30 and October 30 of each year detailing activities carried out during these
studies. Again, the reporting requirements seem excessive, especially in light of
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section 1603(f)(5) which calls for an effectively managed and comprehensively
coordinated process for such studies.34
(4) Joint Committee for Review of Proliferation Programs of the
U.S. Just as the conference agreement provided for an Advisory Board on Arms
Proliferation Policy as a gesture to the House version of the Authorization Act, it
is likely that this agreement included authorization of a Joint Committee for
Review of Proliferation Programs of the U.S. as a gesture to the Senate.
Originally, the SASC-reported bill called for the establishment of a "Non-
Proliferation Program Review Committee." The conference agreement retained
the language contained in the Senate's Authorization bill, but, significantly, added
three modifications. First, it provided State Department representation on the
committee. Second, it added to the duties of the committee a requirement to
"review the programs.. developed by the Department of State to counter terrorism
involving weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems."35 Third, it
provided a termination clause, specifying that the committee will cease to exist six
months after providing a report to Congress. This report will be due no later than
May 1, 1994 and will be presented by the Secretary of Defense.
The modifications to the provisions for this joint committee tend
to support the contention of jurisdictional dispute between the Departments of
Defense and State in the area of proliferation policy. The first two changes which
provide for State Department participation on this committee distribute the powers
of this committee more evenly among federal agencies. In fact, these changes
make a great deal of sense since one of the purposes of the committee is to identify
and eliminate redundancies or uncoordinated efforts in the nonproliferation arena.
Further, the inclusion of a termination clause may be an acknowledgment of the
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powers and responsibilities of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA) which potentially could have been threatened by a permanent committee.
It is somewhat ironic that the final National Defense
Authorization Act for FY 1994 would establish two reviewing bodies to study
matters relating to U.S. nonproliferation and counterproliferation policy, including
issues of redundancy and inter-agency coordination. As illustrated in table 3, there
seems to be enough overlap of duties to suggest that these two bodies resulted
from political compromise in the final Authorization Act. Both of these bodies are
also temporary, further suggesting compromise. Permanent committees would
have been far more threatening to existing organizations with nonproliferation or
counterproliferation roles.
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TABLE 3: Comparison of the Two Reviewing Bodies Established in the Authorization Act
Advisory Board on Non-Proliferation
Arms Proliferation Policy Program Review Committee
Membership: 5 - Persons in private life with stature 6 - Secretaries of Defense (Chmn),
and expertise in arms proliferation State, and Energy, Diretor CIA.
matters Director ACDA, Chnn JCS
Duties: 1. Identify factors contributing to global 1. Identify and review existing and
weapons proliferation which can be most proposed capabilities and
effectively regulated. technologies for support of U.S. non-
proliferation policy with regard to:
2. Identify and assess policy approaches a. intelligence
available to U.S. to discourage transfer b. battlefield surveillance
of targeted weapons and related c. passive & active defenses
equipment and technology. d. counterforce capabilities
e. inspection support
3. Assess effectiveness of current multi- f. support of export control
lateral efforts to control the transfer of programs
weapons and related equipment and
technology. 2. Review all directed energy and
laser programs as related to the
4. Identify and examine methods by above areas with a view to the
which U.S. could reinforce these efforts. elimination of redundancy and
optimization of funding.
5. Identify circumstances under which
U.S. national security interests might 3. Review State lPcpt, programs to
best be served by a transfer of conven- counter terrorism involving weapons
tional military weapons and related of mass destruction/deliverv systems.
equipment/technology, assess whether
such circumstances exist when such a 4. Prescribe requirements and
transfer is made to an allied country priorities for U.S. nonproliferation
which, with the U.S., has mutual capabilities and technologies.
national security interests to be served
by such a transfer. 5. Identify deficiencies in existing
capabilities and technologies.
6. Assess effect on U.S. economy and
the national technology and industrial 6. Formulate short-, medium-, and
base which might result ftom potential long-term programmatic options for
changes in U.S. policy controlling the meeting requirements and eliminating
transfer of such military weapons and deficiencies identified by the
related equipment and technology, committee.
Report Due: May 15, 1994 - report to President May 1, 1994
June 1, 1994 - reports to Congress
Termination: 30 days after presidential report 6 months after report date
Source: Conference Report on HR 2401, National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1994
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Treatment of the Administration's $40 million counterproliferation
initiative was detailed considering the relative insignificance of the size of this
request as a percentage of the entire DoD budget. However, the attention it
received may indicate the gravity of the issues involved and the degree of attention
that can be expected in future related policy debates and legislation. Finally, the
discussion of priorities noted within the authorization process presumes that the
funds authorized for appropriation by the House and Senate in the conference
agreement are subsequently appropriated by both chambers of Congress, the topic
of discussion which follows.
2. The Appropriations Process
a. The House Appropriations Committee - Defense Subcommittee
The Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee
(HAC-D) reduced the Administration's budget request for counterproliferation
initiatives significantly. The Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1994
(H.R. 3116) as passed by the House on September 30, 1993, did not appropriate
funds for the counterproliferation initiatives and research that had been authorized
by the House. 36 Instead, the House appropriated only $8.435 million in Operations
and Maintenance (O&M) funds for DTSA technology security efforts. 37
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TABLE 4: House Action on Coumerproliferation Initiatives (dollars in thousands)
Budget Request Committee Appropriations Change from
Markup Act Budget Request
Counterproliferation 25,000 0 0 -25,000
Intiatives
Research & Analysis 6,000 0 0 -6,000
DTSA 9,500 8,435 8,435 -1,065
Total 40=50 8,435 8,435 -32,065
Sources: HAC-D-reportcd National Defense Appropriations Act for IY 1994 (HR. 3116),
House-passed Appropriations Act, and National Security Council memorandum, Status of
Counterproliferation Initiative Legislation.
The HAC apparently did not question the need for the
counterproliferation funds; rather, it objected to the placement of these funds
under the control of DTSA which had been criticized by the DoD Inspector
General in 1992 for its administrative practices.3 8 The refusal to appropriate funds
for the Administration's counterproliferation initiatives will clearly hamper efforts
in this arena, but apparently was not aimed at any shortcomings within the
Administration's proposal.
Although not directly related to the counterproliferation initiatives
funds, it is interesting to note the HAC-D's treatment of the Administration's
Global Cooperative Initiatives request in the House version of the DoD
Appropriations Bill for FY 1994. The HAC-D reduced the $448 million requested
by the Administration in this category to $383 million for the following reason:
...the Committee is very concerned that by seeking a fund dedicated to peace
making and peacekeeping, the administration is asking Congress to
prospectively approve the necessary funding resources to engage in
unspecified and undetermined future military operations. The Committee
strongly disagrees with this precedent which incrementally erodes the
constitutional prerogative of the Congress to control the purse strings. 39
It is possible that these same or similar reasons also contributed to the
HAC-D denial of funding for the counterproliferation initiatives. Although the
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Administration's request outlined three areas for spending in this category
(counterproliferation measures, technology security and research), there was
apparently no formal plan detailing how the funds would be spent. The slowness
with which top Pentagon positions were filled may have contributed to the lack of
such a plan. It is not surprising then that Congress would be hesitant to
appropriate a sizable pool of money, especially in an era of decreasing budgets,
without a detailed plan for spending the requested funds.
b. The Senate Appropriations Committee - Defense Subcommittee
The Defense Appropriations Subcommittee of the Senate
Appropriations Committee (SAC-D), like the HAC-D, reduced the
Administration's request for new counterproliferation spending initiatives. The
SAC-D appropriated funds for DTSA and eliminated the remaining portion of the
$40 million Administration request dealing with research and other
counterproliferation initiatives.
The SAC-D appropriated $9.198 million for technology security
efforts by DTSA, which was $763,000 more than allowed by the HAC-D. While
this change in DTSA funding is not significant, the committee's decision to cut all
funding for counterproliferation efforts deserves closer attention. The report
language accompanying the bill explains the reduction this way:
The Committee denies $31,000,000.. .for counterproliferation studies. The
Department [DoD] has failed to provide detailed plans or other convincing
justification for the use of these funds. The Senate-passed version of the
fiscal year 1994 Defense authorization bill also denies this funding request.40
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TABLE 5: Senate Action on Counterproliferation Initiatives (dollars in thousands)
Budget Request Committee Appropriations Change from
Markup Act Budget Request
Counterproliferation 25,000 0 0 -25,000
Initiatives
Research & Analysis 6,000 0 0 -6,000
DTSA 9,500 9,198 9,198 -302
Total 40,198 9,198 9,198 -31-3021
Sources: SAC-D-reported National Defense Appropriations Act for F*Y 1994, Senate-passed
Appropriations Act, and National Security Council memorandum, Status of Counterproliferation
Initiative Legislation.
By law, funds must be both authorized and appropriated by Congress
in order to be spent. Accordingly, the SASC's refusal to authorize funds for the
Administration's counterproliferation initiatives sent a clear signal to both the
SAC-D and the Administration. Interestingly, it was Senator Byrd, the SAC
Chairman, who co-sponsored amendment 836 to the Senate Defense Authorization
Act which deleted authorizations for the counterproliferation initiatives. This
made it much easier for the SAC to deny appropriations for counterproliferation.
c Conference Report on DoD Appropriations
The conference agreement on DoD Appropriations was passed in
Congress on November 10, 1993.41 As occurred with the Authorization Act, the
conference agreement on the DoD Appropriations Act for FY 1994 was a
compromise between the Senate and House versions of the bill. However, unlike
the Authorization Act, there was little variation between the two versions of the
Appropriation Act, so the portion of the conference report relating to the
Administration's technology security proposal was far less detailed. In fact,
neither the Senate nor the House appropriated the $31 million requested by the
Administration for counterproliferation initiatives. The conference had only a
small difference in funding for DTSA to be resolved.
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The treatment of this funding in the conference agreement was brief.
In the end, only $8.435 million of the Administration's approximately $40 million
request was appropriated, all of it for DTSA. This represents only 20 percent
funding of the original request. In fact, this final appropriation amount was the
lower of the two appropriations for DTSA in the House and Senate bills. Funding
for counterproliferation initiatives and studies was denied completely, thus
accounting for $31 million of the total reduction. Such a significant reduction,
especially in light of almost full funding of the Administration's initiative in the
final DoD Authorization Act, sends a clear signal to the Administration.
C. SUMMARY
With the recent completion of the DoD budget debate and passage of the final
Defense Authorization and Appropriations Acts in Congress, the following
observations of the legislative treatment of the Clinton Administration's budget
request for counterproliferation measures can be made.
Technology security policy, whether under the guise of crmterproliferation,
nonproliferation, or export controls of sensitive technologies, was clearly a
prominent topic of discussion throughout the congressional debates surrounding
the defense budget. In both the House and Senate, much of the debate over the
defense budget hinged on the end of the Cold War and trying to determine the
appropriate shape, priorities and funding levels for the post-Cold War era DoD.
Weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems were frequently discussed
as the primary threat to U.S. national security as well as to international stability
by both the Administration and the Congress.
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One lesson from this research is that discussion of and concern about a given
topic does not necessarily equate to funding for that issue. Such is the case for the
Clinton Administration's technology security proposal. The Administration
presented Congress with a request for approximately $40 million for
counterproliferation measures. The results of congressional consideration of this
proposal are summarized in the following table.
TABLE 6: Counterproliferation Measures Summary (dollars in thousands)
Bill Budget Request House Senate Conference
Authorization 40,500 39,698 0 39,69842
Appropriations 40,500 8,435 9,198 8,435
Sources: National Security Council memorandum, Status of Counterproliferation Initiative
Legislation, Conference Report on H.R. 3116, and Conference Report on H.R. 2401.
Even with a consensus on the importance of technology security measures in
both the Executive and Legislative branches, the bottom line was a significant
decrease in the Administration's budget request. Several different factors likely
contributed to the decrease. First, the Administration, and DoD in particular,
probably hurt its chances for full funding by not providing a detailed plan or
convincing justification for the use of these funds to Congress. 43 This factor was
cited by the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee as the basis for its
reduction. Part of the blame for this shortcoming can be attributed to the recent
overhaul of the top Pentagon hierarchy by Secretary of Defense Aspin. Beyond
the change in the structure of the organization, however, was the slowness with
which DoD policy-making positions were filled and the controversy surrounding
some of the nominations."
A second factor, was the HAC's refusal to appropriate funds for
counterproliferation initiatives, not because of weak justification, but rather
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because the funds were to be placed under the purview of DTSA, an organization
that has been criticized recently for questionable administrative practices.
A third factor involved issues affecting jurisdiction between the Defense and
State Departments triggered by the Administration's $40 million request. This
initiative would have placed traditional foreign policy matters under the purview
of DoD in an ambitious, and perhaps too hasty, move by the Administration to
reinvent and improve the U.S. foreign policy establishment. As a result, the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, siding with the State Department, reportedly
pressured the SASC to strike language which had authorized $37.5 million for
counterproliferation initiatives. The addition of State Department representation
on the Non-Proliferation Program Review Committee, the call for an Advisory
Board on Arms Proliferation Policy in addition to the Review Committee, and the
temporary status of both bodies further highlight this power struggle.
Out of the six pieces of legislation researched, only the HASC's Authorization
Bill, as amended, and the final National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1994
provided approval for almost the full amount of the Administration's budget
request. This was to no avail, however, because the majority of those funds were
never appropriated by the HAC, SAC, or conference committee.
In hindsight, perhaps the Administration's counterproliferation measures could
have received full funding if DoD had taken more time to develop its plan for
spending these funds. The timing seemed appropriate for such a request, given the
rapidly changing shape of the new world order and the serious threat posed by the
proliferation of these potentially dangerous technologies. Even in this era of a
shrinking defense budget, it seems that the measures proposed by the
Administration could have been sold to Congress by a well-organized and better-
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established Pentagon hierarchy. When presented with a vague request for funding
of undetermined "initiatives," however, Congress' decision was clear. Congress
approved much less funding than was requested and demanded much more
information than was provided.
NOTES
1 "FY 1994 Defense Budget Begins New Era," News Release from the Office ofAssistant Secretar. of
Defense (Public Affairs), March 27, 1993, pp. 2-3.
2 "FY 1994 DoD Budget - New Initiatives," DoD document, September 1993.
3 "Status of Counterproliferation Initiative Legislation -- Information Memorandum," National Security
Council document, October 7, 1993.
4 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994.
S. 1298 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993).
5 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization A ct for Fiscal Year 1994
Report, Report No. 103-112 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 189.
6 Text of the Senate National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Congressional Record,
September 15, 1993, p. S11774.
7 Report No. 103-112. op. cit.. p. 243.
8 Congressional Record, September 15, 1993. op. cit., p. S 11786.
9 Report No. 103-112, op. cit., p. 250, (italics added).
10 Congressional Record, September 15, 1993. op. cit., p. S11786.
11 Report No. 103-112, op. cit., pp. 254-55, (italics added).
12 Ibid., p. 255.
13 Ibid., p. 258-59.
14 "Status of Counterproliferation Initiative Legislation -- Information Memorandum." op. cit.
15 "Amendment 836." Congressional Record. September 10, 1993. p. S 11417.
16 Senate floor debate on amendment 836, Congressional Record. September 10, 1993. p. S 11418.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid
19 Ibid., pp. S11418-19.
20 "Chamber Action - House of Representatives." Congressional Record, September 29. 1993. p. D 1059.
21 U. S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1994, H.R. 2401 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993).
22 "Amendment Offered by Mr. Dellums," Congressional Record. September 28. 1993, p. H71 10.
23 Ibid.
24 "Chamber Action," Congressional Record, November 9, 1993, p. H9273.
25 "Section 1601," Conference Report on fIR2401, National Defense Authorization Act, FY 1994,
November 10, 1993.
26 Ibid.
27 "Amendment Offered by Mr. Kasich of Ohio," Congressional Record. September 13, 1993,
pp. H6622-3.
28 Ibid., p. H6623.
29 U. S. Congress, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Y*ear 1993, Conference Report. Report
No. 102-%6, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 265.
93




33 Ibid., (italics added).
34 Ibid.
"35 Ibid.
36 "Chamber Action - House of Representatives," Congressional Record, September 30, 1993, p. D 1070.
"37 U. S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations
Bill, 1994, Report, Report No. 103-254, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993). p. 82.
38 "Status of Counterproliferation Initiative Legislation - Information Memorandum," op. cit.
39 Report No. 103-254, op. cit., p. 9.
40 U. S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1994,
Report, Report No. 103-153, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 81.
41 "Chamber Action," Congressional Record, November 8, 1993, p. H8978.
42 This figure includes $25 million for international nonproliferation initiatives, $6 million for
counterproliferation research and analysis, and $8,698 for DTSA. The DTSA funds are not broken out
in the conference agreement. but rather are included within the O&M budget total for defense-wide
activities. Hence, the $8,698 million figure is an estimate carried over from the breakout within the
House version of this bill.
43 Report No. 103-153, op. cit., p. 81.
44 Schmitt, op. cit.. p. A15 and R. Jeffrey Smith. op. cit., p. A4.
94
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This thesis has presented an historical analysis of U.S. technology security policy
since the onset of the Cold War and a financial analysis of the $40 million budget request
for technology security, counterproliferation, and export controls in the Clinton
Administration's FY 1994 defense budget presentation. The analysis of CoCom and
the MTCR provided a glimpse of Cold War era U.S. technology security measures
which emphasized multilateral control regimes and the use of export controls as
enforcing mechanisms. In the initial stage of the post-Cold War era, U.S.
technology security policy has begun to shift somewhat in order to account for the
dramatically changed global economic and security environment. Financial
analysis of the $40 million budget request for counterproliferation measures
contained in the Clinton Administration's FY 1994 defense budget presentation
served as a prism for viewing the emerging shape and priorities of U.S. technology
security policy. The result, as presented in this thesis, is the identification of some
of the problems and policy issues associated with technology security in the post-
Cold War environment.
A. PROBLEMS AND POLICY ISSUES
1. Limitations Affecting U.S. Policy
U.S. technology security policy is influenced by more than just legislative
rules and procedures and the priorities of the president in office. This was
illustrated by the complexities surrounding many of the issues addressed in the
preceding pages. The technology security policy emerging from this
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Administration was also shaped and limited by a variety of domestic and
international factors.
President Clinton entered office during a time of transition. One of his
challenges has been to reform a U.S. technology security policy designed to deal
with the old Soviet and Eastern Bloc threat into one better able to address the
realities of the new world order. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact nations has had
a wide-reaching impact, and has forced U.S. leadership to start redefining its
national security environment. With the communist threat no longer looming large
on the horizon, the demand for a peace dividend and less-regulated global trade
has been compelling. This political and economic imperative has significantly
impacted the defense budget in general, and also set in motion a series of measures
to ease regulation of previously restricted technologies. Yet the rate of change
involving Congress and the governmental agencies linked to U.S. technology
security policy (i.e., Commerce, State and Defense) has varied, resulting in a
number of conflicts and adding to the confusion surrounding this issue.
The role of Congress in the U.S. governmental structure is one of checks
and balances, particularly with regard to policy-making by the Executive Branch.
In the case of the Clinton Administration's emerging U.S. technology security
policy, congressional debate and control over the purse strings clearly impacted
this policy. Within the annual budget cycle, the authorizing and appropriating
processes are executed according to priorities set by both the Legislative and
Executive Branch. The congressional committees with jurisdiction over defense
funding and policy, namely the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees,
had a large role in shaping this policy. Operating within the constraints of a U.S.
economy weakened by massive federal and trade deficits, the role of Congress has
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become even more difficult and important. Scarce resources, in turn, set the stage
for budget battles and power struggles, both within and between the branches of
the U.S. Government.
During the debate over the Administration's $40 million budget request for
counterproliferation measures, some of these power struggles became evident. For
example, even after the HASC authorized $39.698 million in appropriations for
counterproliferation measures, the HAC cut this down to $8.435 million. The
rationale for this move was that although the committee members did not disagree
with the need for these counterproliferation measures, they did not approve of the
decision to place the funds under the purview of DTSA. This is only one example
of intra-govemmental conflict overshadowing perceived requirements and
influencing the final budget outcome. As it turned out, this pattern was repeated in
the conference agreement, and the Administration's counterproliferation measures
received only $8.435 million in the final defense budget. Other conflicts were
addressed in the discussion of the differing treatment of this issue by the
congressional committees with jurisdiction in this area, as well as within Executive
Branch Agencies.
Finally, the Administration's eagerness to reshape U.S. technology
security policy may have contributed to the lack of success of their FY 1994
counterproliferation initiatives. The Clinton Administration officially took office
in late-January of 1993 and their much-anticipated budget proposal was expected
only a few months thereafter. Meanwhile, the Administration still had to officially
nominate and receive confirmation of its senior leadership positions. Additionally,
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, immediately began a major reorganization of that
department in order to better address the needs of a post-Cold War world. Hence,
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the Administration's FY 1994 counterproliferation proposal, albeit only a $40
million program, may ha e been presented prematurely. While the topic at hand
was indeed timely and pressing, DoD officials seemed to lack a detailed plan for
spending these funds effectively and efficiently. Consequently, the proposal met
resistance during congressional debate over its funding.
B. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION AND FINDINGS
This thesis addresses a wide range of issues relating to technology security
policy, and, in doing so, answers the primary and subsidiary research questions.
The primary research question was this: How did Congress change the FY 1994
defense budget for technology security as a consequence of the changing role of
U.S. defense technology policy after the Cold War? There is no question that this
issue attracted much attention in both the Executive and Legislative Branches of
government. There seems to be consensus among these bodies that steps must be
taken to resolve the problems associated with this issue.
However, research suggests that there is no consensus yet on the shape of the
required resolution. Congress cut the Administration's budget request significantly
for a number of reasons including the lack of a detailed spending plan, criticism of
the agency assigned oversight of the funds, and a turf war between the Defense
and State Departments and various governmental bodies supporting these two
departments. The uncertainty produced by the rapidly evolving global security
and economic environments in the post-Cold War era also contributed to the lack
of consensus within the U.S. government.
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C. CONCLUSION
The information presented in this thesis provides some insight into emerging
U.S. technology security policy and the role that the budgeting process plays in its
formation and evolution. It is important to remember, however, that the scope of
the research was necessarily limited. Financial analysis of the Administration's
$40 million defense budget request for counterproliferation measures is only one
piece of a larger and more complex U.S. technology security policy.
Both Congress and the Executive Branch seem to agree that the proliferation
of advanced, dual-use technology, particularly as related to weapons of mass
destruction and their delivery systems, is a serious threat to U.S. national security
and international stability. However, this consensus narrows when it comes to
deciding how the U.S. should r,.spond to this threat. The lack of consensus on a
solution is attributable, in part, to the speed at which this problem is unfolding.
This thesis has shown that while awareness of the threat exists, Coq_-ess seems
unwilling to throw funds at this problem haphazardly. Congressional treatment of
the Aaministration's $40 million budget request illustrates this finding.
Even with the adverse treatment of the budget request presented in this thesis,
interest in this issue is unlikely to diminish in the near future. As mentioned
above, the U.S. Export Administration Act expires in June 1994 and legislation has
already been introduced to revise this Act. As proposed, the revised EAA would
end "...export controls aimed at preventing the export of technology to the former
Soviet republics and China, and redirects the controls toward halting the
proliferation of weapons."' Additionally, the legislation would shift the focus of
controls away from technology not directly linked to weapons and onto so-called
"chokepoint technologies" critical to the manufacturing of high-interest weapon
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systems. Early reports suggest that the Clinton Administration, including
Department of Defense officials, support such changes. 2 In a recent appearance
before Congress, Ashton Carter, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear
Security and Counterproliferation, stated that the U.S. should "...only apply
controls to particular technologies and weapons when other nations also agree not
to export these products." 3 Clearly, the debate over this issue is far from finished.
The rapidly changing global security and economic environment seems likely
to ensure a continuing demand for these potentially dangerous technologies for the
foreseeable future. The challenge for U.S. leadership is to develop an effective
technology security policy that balances the harsh reality of U.S. economic
constraints and the threats posed by the new world order.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
In answering the research questions, others have been raised. The purpose of
this section is to briefly describe potential areas of interest for follow-on research
relating to this topic.
First, the role of multilateral control regimes continues to evolve in the post-
Cold War environment. As discussed earlier, CoCom and the MTCR have played
large roles in U.S. technology security policy in the past. Clearly, such regimes
will continue to have an important role in this policy debate in the future. The role
of the MTCR will likely remain on center stage in the near future as the PRC
continues to flex its muscles in the new world order. For example, during his
September 27, 1993 address to the United Nations, President Clinton suggested
that the MTCR should be strengthened and transformed "...from an agreement on
technology transfer among just 23 nations to a set of rules that can command
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universal adherence.'14 Such a move would spread the burden of
counterproliferation and nonproliferation efforts more evenly among participating
nations. Further research on moves to strengthen the MTCR may provide useful
information on the future role of these regimes. The PRC is likely to continue to
test the strength and resolve of the MTCR member-nations. Accordingly, an
ongoing and more detailed case study of this nation and its treatment of advanced,
dual-use technology would be both interesting and beneficial for its applications to
and influence on U.S. technology security policy.
The future of CoCom as a critical part of U.S. technology security policy
seems to be far less certain. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union and
Warsaw Pact, the members of CoCom have struggled with the question of whether
to incorporate these former communist nations into their organization or to disband
CoCom altogether now that the threat from the Eastern Bloc appears to have
faded. U.S. industry appears to be the primary advocate for easing restrictions on
exports to these countries. This is reflected in legislation recently proposed in
Congress to revise the Export Administration Act (EAA) which expires in June
1994.' Further research on the development of and debate over the revised EAA
will likely impact U.S. technology security policy and provide additional insight
into the Clinton Administration's evolving policy priorities and objectives in this
arena.
Second, it might prove useful to conduct a similar analysis of any
counterproliferation proposal offered by the Administration for FY 1995. A
significant factor in the denial of $31 million in funds for counterproliferation and
nonproliferation initiatives in the FY 1994 budget was the lack of a well-
developed plan for spending such funds. This is partly attributable to the
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reorganization of senior DoD positions by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and the
slowness with which these officials were named. Once all of these positions are
filled, however, this factor should no longer affect the outcome of the
Administration's policy and any associated budget requests. Thus, it would be
useful to track a FY 1995 counterproliferation proposal through the budget process
and compare the results and related debate to the data presented in this thesis.
Such a comparison would provide some indication of the perceived importance of
this issue. Assuming the Administration resolves its internal problems, such
policies will stand more chance of being judged or, their merits rather than on turf
wars and political maneuvering.
Finally, future counterproliferation proposals will likely be influenced by the
reports to be submitted by the Non-Proliferation Program Review Committee and
Advisory Board on Arms Proliferation Policy in May 1994. These are the two
bodies established by the FY 1994 Defense Authorization Act. Although funds
were not appropriated specifically for these two bodies, it is likely that they will be
established anyway because of their temporary nature and since operating funds
were initially set to be paid "out-of-pocket" by participating federal agencies. The
charter of the committees is to investigate and prioritize all ongoing
counterproliferation and nonproliferation initiatives within the Federal
Government in order to better coordinate these efforts as well as to ensure that the
best ones are adequately funded. The findings of these two committees and the
attention given to the resulting reports by Congress and the Executive Branch are
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